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Abstract 
 Since the creation of the GATT and the WTO, one of the main goals has been to decrease 
trade barriers and increase openness in trade.  However, there has been concern that as importing 
countries honor WTO commitments and lower tariff rates, they may be replacing traditional 
tariff barriers with non-tariff barriers.  Recent literature has found that the implementation of 
food safety standards, specifically the use of import notifications and rejections, has acted as a 
significant barrier to trade in both the EU and the US.  This thesis empirically examines the 
relation between declining tariff rates and a count of EU seafood import notifications as a 
measure of non-tariff barriers.  Possible motives for the use of import notifications are divided 
into two categories: risk and protectionism.  The results provide evidence showing not only a 
negative relation between tariff and non-tariff barriers, but possible illegitimate use of import 
notifications by importing countries with a high need for protection.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
One of the main goals of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been to increase agricultural trade by 
minimizing trade restrictions, including traditional tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs).  As countries honor WTO commitments and reduce tariff rates, concern has 
arisen that traditional trade barriers are simply being replaced with NTBs.  To curb the 
implementation of NTBs, the WTO created sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules to 
ensure that any trade standards put in place must be justified by scientific evidence that 
proves the barrier is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant health.  
While the use of safety regulations and standards is often considered necessary to 
prevent the spread of harmful diseases and protect consumers, there is still concern that 
these measures can act as NTBs.  It has been found that standards may be used as NTBs 
for political purposes (Baylis, Martens, Nogueira, 2009).  In this thesis, non-tariff barriers 
are defined as barriers that are not tariffs and have a negative effect on trade (Hillman, 
1991).  Deardorff and Stern (1998) provide a breakdown of non-tariff barriers into five 
categories:  
1. Volume controls: import quotas, voluntary export restraints, etc. 
2. Price controls: variable levies, antidumping duties, etc. 
3. Monitoring policies: domestic government policies 
4. Production measures: subsidies, restrictive taxes, etc. 
5. Technical barriers: health and safety standards, resulting bans, etc.  
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In this thesis, I explore the use of technical barriers, specifically European Union (EU) 
import notifications from the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), which 
occur as a result from imports failing to adhere to EU food safety standards.  
Regardless of their justification, SPS standards can act as barriers to trade (for 
examples, see Grant and Anders, 2010; Baylis, Nogueira, and Pace, 2010; Otsuki, 
Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001; Disdier and Marette, 2010).  The flexibility in creating and 
applying SPS barriers leaves room for protectionist motives to influence the 
implementation of NTBs.  This thesis explores the motives behind NTBs, asking whether 
NTBs increase as tariff rates fall, and whether they are more intensively used by 
countries that have a large domestic demand for protection.  Specifically, I explore these 
questions by considering seafood trade with the EU. 
1.1 Seafood Trade  
The production and trade of seafood products has been on the rise since the 
1980s.  In 2008, world production of seafood was 142 million tonnes, with approximately 
81 percent produced for human consumption.  Nearly 40 percent of seafood production is 
traded internationally, with much of this trade involving developing countries (FAO 
Yearbook, 2008).  Seafood trade has also been increasing between developed and 
developing countries with 78 percent of the value of all seafood trade being imported by 
developed countries (FAO Yearbook, 2008).  
The EU increased imports of seafood products from just over 5 billion Euro in 1998 
to 15.5 billion Euro in 2009, compared to 2.5 billion Euro worth of EU seafood exports in 
2009.  The largest portion of EU seafood imports by value is comprised of pacific salmon 
(10 percent), frozen shrimp (9 percent), followed by canned tuna and frozen filleted 
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Atlantic pollock (4 percent).  With the exception of pacific salmon, the majority of these 
products were imported from developing countries.  The main supplier of shrimp by 
value was Ecuador (19 percent), followed by India (12 percent) and Argentina (10 
percent) while the main supplier of Alaskan pollock to the EU was China at 61 percent 
(European Commission, 2009a). 
1.2 EU Seafood Regulations 
In 1963 the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) created the Codex Alimentarius Commission to help develop 
coordinated food standards for all countries to protect consumers from potential food 
safety breaches.  The Codex provided a base for future regulations by governments, the 
FAO, and the WHO in an effort to harmonize international standards for all food 
products.  Specific standards relating to fish products were implemented starting in the 
late 1970s.  The Codex later adapted standards to comply with the Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) system, which is designed to prevent contamination and 
spread of disease.   
Currently, there are seven main principles of HACCP, which the EU interprets 
and implements as follows (Higuera-Ciapara and Noriega-Orozco 2000; Ropkins and 
Beck 2000): 
1. Detailed written document is required, including both product and process 
descriptions. 
2. Critical control points (CCPs) must be identified.  These are the points during 
the production process when action may be taken to control or eliminate 
hazards. 
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3. Health hazards must be identified if hazards exceed allowable limits. 
4. Hazard evaluations and preventive measures must be implemented.  Each 
CCP must be monitored. 
5. All possible corrective actions must be clearly defined. 
6. Records must be consistently monitoring and verified. 
7. Verification procedures must be routine. 
EU standards on food safety tend to be stricter than the minimum recommended 
Codex standards, making it difficult for developing countries to comply and meet EU-
specific standards.  In recent years, the WHO and FAO have begun to address the 
concern that developing countries may not be able to properly implement minimal 
HACCP standards.  Steps have been created by the WHO and the FAO to help 
developing countries fulfill initial prerequisite changes prior to implementation of full 
standards.  These initial changes include producer education on identifying the many 
possible sources of contamination from feed to transportation.  Identifying the source of 
the problem allows for better implementation of full standards.  Although progress has 
been made to make standards easier to implement in developing countries, as will be 
shown later in this thesis, there is still a gap in ability to meet standards between 
developing countries and developed countries (FAO/WHO, 1999). 
Prior to the implementation of an over-arching HACCP standard by the European 
Commission (EC), EU members implemented their own versions of HACCP regulations, 
which created friction in trade between member states.  Due to the differences in the EU, 
the EC implemented Directive 91/493/EEC specifically for HACCP regulations of 
seafood products along with two other Directives specifically for meat and dairy 
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products.  These three directives were focused on requirements for safe food production.  
In 1993 another directive, 93/43/EEC, was implemented with a specific focus on hygiene 
of all food products (Ropkins and Beck, 2000). 
Directive 91/67/EC has since been amended and several other Council Directives 
and Commission Decisions have been implemented regarding regulations of seafood 
products on the market (European Commission, 2011a).  In 2006, Directive 2006/88/EC 
was implemented to replace 91/67/EC and had its latest amendment in 2008.  This 
directive establishes minimum controls in the event of an outbreak, aims to increase 
awareness in all people involved in the aquaculture process, and creates animal health 
requirements (European Commission, 2011b).  A detailed list of all EU seafood import 
regulations and seafood products directly affected can be found in Appendix A. 
1.3 EU Rejection System 
The EU established the RASFF in 1979.  All EU member countries plus the 
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) use the RASFF.  Currently, the 
RASFF has two main notification divisions based on when products are flagged and the 
seriousness of required action.  The first notification category called a market notification 
is further broken down into alert notifications and information notifications.  Market 
notifications occur if a product has entered the EU market, and after entering is found to 
contain a consumer threat.  If products on the market are considered a threat in need of 
immediate action, an alert notification is triggered and the product is withdrawn from the 
market to be held, destroyed, removed from the country, or subject to any other possible 
action.  Products on the market that receive a notification but are not deemed an 
immediate threat, or for which immediate withdrawal is not required, trigger information 
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notifications and any action can be taken, as with alert notifications.  The second 
notification category is a border rejection notification, which signals that a product was 
rejected at the border and never entered into the EU.  Alert and information notifications 
can also trigger rejections on products after they have already entered into the market 
(European Commission, 2008). 
 Prior to 2008 the two main divisions of the RASFF were alert and information 
notifications.  There were no separate categories for border rejections or market 
notifications, however, any border rejections that occurred still triggered notifications.  
Because the data for this thesis include the change in division of notifications, all 
notifications will be included in one notification count variable regardless of action taken.  
These actions include border rejections, re-dispatches to the exporter, destruction, 
treatment, detainment, sales bans, withdrawal from the market, along with several other 
less severe actions such as labeling, dating, and, no action taken. 
 In 2008, the largest share of all initial notifications of all products was border 
rejections at 46 percent.  Seafood products accounted for 11 percent of these rejections 
and were the most rejected animal product.  Total numbers of notifications have 
increased between 2006 and 2008.  There was a slight decrease in alert notifications due 
to stricter definitions of alerts, however, both information notifications and border 
rejection notifications increased during this time (European Commission, 2008). 
1.4 EU Import Inspection System 
While the EU has had over-arching standards for all member states since the early 
1990s, each country is responsible for its own interpretation and enforcement of the 
standards.  General EU import rules require that all seafood products: 
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1. Are imported only from previously approved countries. 
2. Enter the EU only through approved Border Inspection Posts (BIPs). 
3. Are subjected to thorough document checks and possible physical checks.  
A Council Directive implemented in 1991, 91/67/EC, defines basic regulations that must 
be followed to place seafood products on the market, and holds third countries to the 
same standards as EU member countries.  The Directive outlines procedures for 
becoming an approved exporter, as well as creates three divisions (List I, List II, and List 
III) for common seafood diseases based on severity and concern for spread within the 
EU.  List I currently applies to a single disease, infectious salmon anaemia (ISA), which 
is currently an exotic disease to the EU.  This division is the most severe and any ISA 
contaminated seafood is not allowed movement into or within the EU.  List II diseases 
are found in the EU and the goal is to control and eliminate these diseases.  List III 
diseases are the least severe and are frequently found within the EU.  Fisheries, as well as 
specific zones and non-member countries must be preapproved and certified disease-free 
before movement of seafood within the EU or importation from third countries.  
Exporting countries who are not preapproved in terms of Lists I-III risk rejection at the 
EU border (European Commission, 2007).   
According to a source
1
 at the Food Standards Agency in the United Kingdom 
(UK), once a shipment is imported into the EU, it is allowed to move between EU 
countries uninspected.  Because each member state is responsible for its own 
implementation of EU standards, it is possible that certain exporters may send shipments 
to specific EU member states believing these states have more lax standards.  The EU 
                                                     
1
 Sriram Balasingam, Scientific Officer, Imported Food Team, Enforcement & Local Authority Delivery 
Division, Food Standards Agency. 
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Food and Veterinary Office, however, inspects ports across member states to ensure that 
at least the minimum EU standard is met.  The Food and Safety Act of 1990 requires that 
all products intended for human consumption must not be rendered injurious to health, 
must be fit for human consumption and cannot contain high levels of contamination.  If a 
shipment that does not meet EU food standards enters into the EU market, then a 
notification can be issued and the shipment may be sent out of the country or destroyed 
(European Commission, 2008). 
1.5 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Questions about the use of standards and regulations in trade initially arose during 
the Uruguay round of the GATT, which led to the concern that as maximum tariff rates 
were being reduced by the WTO, countries were simply replacing high tariff rates by 
using standards as NTBs.  Regulations were implemented so that standards were required 
to have a sound basis in science, but there is still concern that standards, even with a 
backing in science, may be leading to more NTBs as tariffs decrease.  In this thesis, I 
explore the relation between tariff and non-tariff barriers, and whether or not NTBs are 
being used as a tool for trade protection. 
Baylis, Nogueira, and Pace (2010) and Grant and Anders (2010) have found that 
import rejections and notifications of seafood products act as significant NTBs.  In this 
thesis I use a count of EU notifications as a measure of NTBs to examine the relation 
between EU import notifications and tariff rates to determine the following: 
1. As tariff rates decrease, is there an increase in the number of notifications? 
2. Is there evidence that countries with higher demand for domestic production 
tend to have higher rejection and notification rates? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review on Barriers to Trade 
A large portion of previous research on NTBs has examined the economic effects 
of standards.  I identify two approaches to measuring the effects of NTBs in the literature: 
the examination of trade effects of different types and counts of standards, and the 
examination of trade effects of failure to adhere to standards through bans and import 
rejections.  In this chapter I discuss previous literature on the quantification of NTBs and 
give an overview of the standards as barriers argument.  I also discuss literature on bans 
and import rejections, and conclude with a discussion of literature on tariffs and NTBs. 
2.1 Quantifying Non-Tariff Barriers 
One of the main problems encountered when analyzing NTBs is deciding how to 
quantify them to examine them econometrically.  The idea of an NTB is relatively 
abstract, particularly when considering technical barriers to trade.  The difficulty lies in 
how to identify, and subsequently quantify, a technical barrier to trade, especially when 
compared to a more traditional NTB such as a quota.  A large part of previous NTB 
research avoids the use of empirical analysis due to the difficult nature of NTBs.  Beghin 
and Bureau (2001) provide a good overview of existing methods and approaches used to 
quantify barriers.    
The “inventory-based” approach is one of the main methods used to quantify 
NTBs (Beghin and Bureau, 2001).  These authors found three main areas in which this 
method is commonly used: regulations or standards, detentions, and industry complaints.  
Using counts of these rules and actions is a simple way to create an NTB variable for use 
in analysis, however it can be limiting because a count does not capture differences in 
types and impacts of standards.  The effect of a single notification on imports of a 
specific product from a specific country, the NTB measure used in this thesis, has 
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significantly less variation than specific food standards.  Different types of notifications 
will not be weighted in this thesis because variability in the severity of notifications is 
much less of a concern when using standards as measures of NTBs.  The use of a count 
variable is often used in the context of a gravity model to examine how a potential barrier 
can impact trade (Beghin and Bureau, 2010).  
The gravity model is used frequently in trade research, and is used by a majority 
of the literature presented in the remainder of this chapter.  The gravity model takes into 
account the “mass” and resulting “pull” (a play on physical gravitational forces) between 
trading countries to predict changes in trade flows.  Variables typically included to 
measure the “pull” on trade flows are: income, distance, language, and several other 
geographic and cultural variables to help predict trade flows.  For example, it is expected 
that countries with close borders and similar languages will have a greater “pull” towards 
each other and will trade more frequently. The gravity model provides a good base to 
examine changes in trade flows while controlling for potential NTBs.  The theoretical 
framework of gravity models has been discussed and updated several times (Bergstrand, 
1985; McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), but the basic idea of the 
gravity model still remains the same.  Several papers, as discussed below, use the gravity 
model in conjunction with count-type variables as well as other quantification methods to 
determine effects of NTBs. 
2.2 Standards as Barriers versus Catalysts 
A majority of the NTB literature is focused on the standards as barriers versus 
catalysts argument, which explores whether standards act as barriers by reducing trade or 
act as catalysts by increasing trade.  While standards may impede trade, particularly for 
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developing countries, it is possible that countries with similar standards might experience 
increases in trade flows.  Testing whether standards act as a barrier or a catalyst can be 
approached in several different ways.  One method is to count numbers of standards to 
measure the effects on trade flow, while another approach uses components of standards 
to measure the effect of specific standards on trade.  For example, actual amounts of 
maximum residue limits can be used to examine how changes in limits change trade 
flows.  Another approach is to examine the effects of outcomes from failing to adhere to 
standards, including the examination of import notifications and rejections as well as the 
effects of product bans.  Overall, the results tend to favor the standards as barriers 
argument, but can vary slightly.  Even considering differences in results between studies, 
standards do appear to have significant effect on trade. 
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) used a gravity model to measure the effects 
of specific levels of SPS standards on trade between the EU-15 and a small group of 
African countries.  They used a decrease in maximum aflatoxin levels on fruits, 
vegetables, nuts, and cereals allowed into the EU implemented in the late 1990s and early 
2000s to identify the effect of these standards.  As the maximum levels of aflatoxins 
allowed into the EU were reduced, Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) found a resulting 
negative impact on trade.  The comparative gain in human health resulting from lowering 
maximum levels seemed to be very small compared to the trade losses associated with the 
stricter limits.  Overall, it was found that an increase in stringency of standards seemed to 
lead to a reduction in trade flows, therefore, this particular aflatoxin standard acted as a 
barrier to trade. 
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A similar gravity model approach combined with welfare analysis was taken by 
Disdier and Marette (2010).  They examined effects of NTBs, measured as maximum 
residue limits set by the United States (US), the EU-15, Japan, and Canada, on crustacean 
trade.  Because the gravity model cannot determine changes in supply and demand, they 
included a welfare analysis as well.  It was found that standards increased domestic 
welfare of importers, but often decreased welfare for exporters.  It was also found that the 
reduction in maximum levels impeded trade flows, showing that these standards acted as 
significant NTBs.   
Nguyen and Wilson (2009) examined the impacts of standards, through the use of 
a gravity model, focusing on seafood imports into the US, Japan, and the EU.  The 
authors used a dummy variable equal to 1 if a standard was imposed by the importing 
country rather than including a variable that captured actual limits as in Disdier and 
Marette (2010) and Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001).  Differing types of standards 
were included: maximum residue limits for the EU, HACCP regulations for the US, and 
Japan Law for Japan.  After applying four separate versions of the gravity model, it was 
found that all three separate standards had a mostly negative impact on trade of seafood 
products, particularly in the case of shrimp and mollusks, which tend to be exported from 
developing countries. 
Anders and Caswell (2009) examined the effects implementation of HACCP 
standards in the US had on trade flows using a gravity model.  They analyzed seafood 
imports into the US over a 14-year period.  Three different models were used to include 
varying trade agreements, and all models were analyzed using trade volume and trade 
value.  The authors found across all three models that implementation of HACCP 
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standards had a negative effect on both volume and value of seafood imported into the 
US.  They also found that exporters in developing countries were negatively impacted 
while exporters in developed countries were either less negatively impacted or positively 
impacted by the US standards.  Overall, it was found in this study that standards act as a 
barrier to trade particularly for small, developing exporters while standards can act as 
catalysts to trade for larger exporters. 
Swann, Temple, and Shurmer (1996) used a count of standards in Germany and 
the UK by industry to determine possible impacts they might have on trade, rather than 
using the actual level of standard.  They made the assumption that all standards had equal 
importance, and therefore equal weights, but distinguished between standards that were 
similar across countries and standards that differed internationally.  These counts were 
then included in different variations of trade equations to measure impacts of the number 
of standards on imports, exports, and the overall trade ratio.  They found that UK country 
specific standards did not decrease imports to the UK and increased exports from the UK, 
therefore standards may act as catalysts to trade.   
A similar approach was used by Moenius (2004), who used a count of physical 
paper documents that included standard details for specific importing countries and 
industries as a standards variable.  The count included 12 different developed countries 
and was incorporated into a gravity model of trade.  Each document was counted as one 
standard, and the count was divided by industry, country, and year.  Nine separate 
industries were used, including food and beverages.  A distinction was made between 
shared standards and country-specific standards, and it was acknowledged that certain 
standards probably have different economic importance but ultimately were not 
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weighted.  This analysis showed an increase in trade for countries with similar standards 
and, surprisingly, that dissimilar standards also increased trade.  It appears that one of the 
major limitations of Moenius (2004) as well as Swann, Temple, and Shurmer (1996) was 
the inability to differentiate between the weights, or severity, of standards.  
Another approach to examining standards is to use a less-empirical analysis and 
instead examine effects of standards on exporting (and usually developing) countries 
through case studies.  Jaffee and Henson (2004) argue that individual country responses 
to standards can vary and standards can act as barriers or catalysts based on those 
responses.  The ever-changing standards set by developing countries can be hard to 
interpret and keep up with, especially in terms of costs.  Jaffee and Henson (2004) 
continue by saying that if developing countries can make good investments while 
changing to adapt to standards, they can actually improve their trade in the long run.  
They therefore imply that standards are not a “black and white” issue.  Even if trade is 
reduced in the short run, appropriate and effective responses can possibly have positive 
effects for in the long run.   
2.3 Product Bans 
One of the largest repercussions of failure to adhere to standards is the possibility 
of full bans of groups of products from entire countries or regions. Numerous bans over 
the past 20 years have occurred in seafood trade, particularly of exports from developing 
Asian and African countries.  Several case studies have analyzed the economic 
implications of these bans.   
In 1997 there was a ban on all fishery products from Bangladesh into the EU.  
The FAO had been involved in assisting Bangladesh improve the food safety since the 
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1980s after concerns over a lack of food safety regulations arose from the US and Japan.  
By 1996 the FAO had helped implement a HACCP system in Bangladesh, but 
Bangladesh still had serious problems with quality control illustrated by failed 
inspections performed by the EU on Bangladeshi seafood processing plants.  Cato and 
Lima dos Santos (1998) examined the impact the resulting ban had on Bangladesh and on 
global seafood trade.  After the implementation of the ban, imports of Bangladeshi frozen 
shrimp increased dramatically in developed countries not involved in the ban, namely the 
US and Japan.  Even accounting for trade deflection, Bangladesh still saw an 8.7 percent 
decline of seafood exports compared to the anticipated sales for the time of the ban.  A 
survey was conducted to collect data from individual plants in Bangladesh.  Many of the 
respondents were able to redirect frozen shipments to the US and Japan, and very few 
shipments were actually destroyed by the EU.  The ban raised awareness on the 
importance of having and upholding standards that match the international community.  
Overall, there was evidence that the ban created trade deflection and acted as a non-tariff 
barrier to trade. 
Kenya has also experienced multiple restrictions on their exports of fish.  In the 
spring of 1997 a shipment of Nile Perch was flagged during an EU border inspection for 
being contaminated with salmonellae.  This finding led to further inspections of all 
following shipments of Nile Perch from Kenya.  By late 1997, all shipments of fresh fish 
from Kenya were banned from the EU.  This ban lasted through June 1998, but concern 
over contamination of fish from Lake Victoria led to a second ban in 1999.  Henson, 
Brouder, and Mitullah (2000) analyzed the after-effects of the bans on trade flows and the 
Kenyan economy.  Kenya made efforts to create standards equivalent to the EU, but the 
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costs were very high.  There was also evidence that trade normally intended for the EU 
was diverted to Asian importers after the ban.  Overall exports of fish from Kenya 
decreased, and several producers had significant financial losses due to the costs of 
adhering to the new standards (Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah, 2000).   
The effects of these bans resulting from the failure to comply with EU standards 
have been well documented, and for the most part, were found to decrease trade.  In the 
case of shrimp restrictions from Bangladesh in 1997, the loss to Bangladesh was nearly 
14.7 million US dollars (Cato and Lima dos Santos, 1998).  During the 1997 and 1999 
bans on fish from Kenya, overall fish exports declined by 37 percent in 1998 and fresh 
fillet exports declined by 86 percent in the same year.  (Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah, 
2000). 
2.4 Rejections as Non-Tariff Barriers 
Import rejections resulting from failure to conform to standards usually occur 
before bans are implemented, and can also directly impact international trade flows.  
Although it seems intuitive that rejections could act as non-tariff barriers, little research 
has been performed specifically on import rejections, with a few recent exceptions 
(Baylis, Martens, and Nogueira, 2009; Grant and Anders, 2010; Baylis, Nogueira, and 
Pace, 2010; Buzby, Unnevehr, and Roberts, 2008).  As data become more available on 
import rejections and alerts, more research is focusing on rejections as NTBs.  Both the 
US and the EU have made access to this basic information available, therefore research 
has been primarily limited to these importers, but the preliminary results have proved 
very interesting. 
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 Both Grant and Anders (2010) and Baylis, Nogueira, and Pace (2010) used 
rejection data to examine effects rejections as NTBs.  Grant and Anders (2010) used US 
import rejections of seafood products that arose from failure to meet Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) standards.  They used a gravity model including a count of US 
rejections by exporting country, product at the four-digit Harmonized System (HS) level, 
and year to examine effects on trade values.  Analyzing cross-sectional data for 1997, 
2000, 2004, and 2006, they found that increases in rejections in the US increases imports 
to other, non-US markets in each year.  This study provides evidence that import 
rejections directly impact trade flows and can create trade deflection. 
 Similar results were found by Baylis, Nogueira, and Pace (2010), but rather than 
using US rejections, a count of EU rejections and notifications were used as the main 
right-hand-side variable.  As in the US, seafood products are consistently one of the most 
rejected products in the EU.  This project also used trade values in a gravity model to 
determine effects of import rejections on trade.  Unlike Grant and Anders (2010) 
rejections were counted by country pair, year, and at the six-digit HS level, rather than 
the four-digit HS level.  Separate regressions were performed for EU importers and non-
EU importers.  As expected, higher levels of rejections were negatively correlated with 
imports into the EU.  Baylis, Nogueira, and Pace (2010), like Grant and Anders (2010), 
found that higher counts of import rejections increased imports into non-EU countries 
providing evidence of trade deflection.  In this study, it was again found that import 
rejections and notifications act as significant barriers to trade. 
Baylis, Martens, and Nogueira (2009) studied the potential cause of US import 
rejections.  They found evidence that the probability of having a US rejection was 
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increased by domestic demand for protection.  This result signaled that import rejections 
may not be strictly based in science, but may be influenced by political pressure and may 
be used as purposeful trade barriers rather than simply the byproducts of tough standards.  
They used lobby expenditures combined with imports and found that an increase in 
lobbying is correlated with an increase in the probability of having a rejection.  It was 
also found that if a high level of corruption existed in the exporting country, the 
probability of a rejection increased.  It can be inferred from these results that 
protectionism is playing a role in rejections and they are being used purposefully to 
hinder trade rather than occurring simply as incidental barriers. 
2.5 Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers 
Research examining the relation between traditional tariff barriers and NTBs 
seems to be particularly sparse.  Several studies performed analyses to examine the 
effects of total barriers on trade, but I have yet to find an empirical study examining the 
direct relation between the two types of trade barriers.  It is often assumed that as WTO 
negotiations continue to lower tariff rates in the interest of creating free trade the use of 
NTBs will increase, but the actual research to explore this phenomenon is, again, lacking. 
One method frequently used when examining the combined effect of tariffs and 
NTBs is the calculation of a tariff equivalency (Beghin and Bureau 2001).  This method 
is used to calculate a price wedge between prices including tariff rates and prices without 
tariff rates.  The resulting gap is assumed to be the result of an NTB, and changes in trade 
due to this gap can be measured.  However, this method lacks one key component: the 
ability to identify what barrier is actually causing the price gap. 
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To explore the effect of both tariffs and NTBs on trade, Guillotreau and Péridy 
(2000) and Chimingui and Dessus (2008) used calculations of tariff equivalencies as 
measures of NTBs.  Guillotreau and Péridy (2000) used seafood data and calculated a 
tariff equivalent using a similar method to the price wedge method used by Fontagne and 
Péridy (1994). The problem, as mentioned above, with the equivalency calculation is that 
it can only capture that there is an NTB but fails to identify the actual NTB.  A variable 
adding the tariff equivalent and tariff rate was included in a gravity model to assess the 
effects total trade barriers have on trade.  They found that the trade barrier had an overall 
negative effect on trade in both the long- and short-run for total seafood as well as 
shellfish alone.  Trade barriers were found to be not significant for fresh and frozen 
seafood and fresh fish but had a negative effect on prepared seafood and prepared fish 
(much more so than overall seafood).  This result signals that prepared seafood trade is 
more strongly affected by tariffs and NTBs than the rest of seafood trade.   
Overall, few studies use both NTBs and tariff barriers in the same analysis.  The 
focus of most studies in this area tends to be on the overall effect of trade barriers rather 
than the relation between conventional barriers (tariffs) and non-tariff barriers.  One 
contribution of this thesis is to explicitly examine if NTBs are replacing tariff barriers.  
All NTBs should have a valid reason for implementation.  In the case of standards and 
resulting notifications and bans, all should be based in sound scientific reasoning.  This 
thesis examines the relation between tariffs and NTBs and the separates scientific 
justification from possible protectionist motives to increase NTBs in the form of import 
notifications. 
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Chapter 3: Methods and Model 
In this chapter I explain my methods and model to show how I intend to estimate 
the relation between country, product, and trade characteristics and the number of 
seafood import notifications in the EU.   
3.1 Methods 
 The dependent variable for this thesis,                   , is a count of events,  
therefore, a nonlinear approach must be taken so the prediction of events will remain 
positive integers.  The standard distribution for count data is the Poisson probability 
distribution.  The general Poisson distribution is as follows (StataCorp, 2005): 
        
     
  
             (1) 
where y is the value of the dependent variable and λ is a parameter equal to the mean (μ) 
and the variance of Y, which is also equal to: 
             (2) 
where X is the independent variable and β its coefficient.  The data for this thesis are 
arranged as a panel based on trade flows from exporting country to importing country for 
a specific seafood product over a year’s time.  Applying the Poisson distributions to the 
panel dataset, I get the following: 
                
             
      
 (3) 
and 
                  
       (4) 
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where i is importing country, j is exporting country, h is seafood product, and t is time in 
years.  Along with the assumption that                 , the Poisson distribution is 
also based on the four following assumptions: 
1. There is a rate of occurrence called the incidence rate.  The probability of 
receiving a notification in one year is the incidence rate for this thesis. 
2. The incidence rate does not change within or across time periods. For example if 
the rate of occurrence for one month is 10 notifications, then one full year (12 
months) should have approximately 120 notifications and 11 years should have 
approximately 1320 notifications. 
3. For a very small portion of the time period, the probability of getting a 
notification is negligible.  Therefore the probability of receiving more than one 
notification in a small portion of time is also negligible. 
4. The probability of country j receiving a notification in one time period is 
independent of country j receiving a notification in a different time period. 
Finding data that fully fit within these four assumptions as well as the assumption 
that the mean is equal to the variance is very difficult, and it appears that the data for this 
thesis violate at least two of the above assumptions.  First, the mean of 
                   is equal to 0.013 while the variance is equal to 0.071, where the very 
low mean value is a result of an excess amount of zeros.  If the variance is less than the 
mean, then there is under-dispersion.  If the variance is greater than the mean, as in this 
case, there is over-dispersion in the data.  Over-dispersion is cause for concern because it 
may cause the coefficients estimated with a Poisson model to have small standard errors 
and falsely significant results.  Second, the fourth assumption that notifications are 
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independent from each other across time periods is probably violated with these data.  
Once an exporter receives a notification, importers may increase inspections on 
subsequent shipments that may, in turn, lead to further notifications in future time 
periods.  It essentially increases the risk of an exporter.  Because two main assumptions 
of the Poisson distribution are likely violated in my data, the Poisson distribution may not 
be appropriate and different models must be considered.  
 Several possible methods exist to examine over-dispersed count data.  These 
include the negative binomial, the zero-inflated Poisson, and zero-inflated negative 
binomial.
2
  The negative binomial will be used as a comparison to the Poisson model. 
Baylis, Martens, and Nogueira (2009) use a negative binomial model in a similar way to 
predict counts of US rejections, also due to over-dispersion of the Poisson distribution. 
The Poisson model is a special case of the negative binomial model, where the 
negative binomial allows for an unequal mean and variance.  The dispersion parameter, 
α, is equal to 0 in a Poisson distribution, but it is variable in a negative binomial 
distribution.  The negative binomial also includes an omitted variable, ν, where 
(StataCorp, 2005):     
                       (5) 
and 
        
           
 
 
         (6) 
                                                     
2
 Stata does not include zero-inflated Poisson or zero-inflated negative binomial commands for panel data. 
                           (7) 
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The negative binomial will serve as the base model for this thesis with the Poisson as a 
comparison example.  Several different regressions of the base model are included as 
robustness tests.   
3.2 Model 
One objective of this thesis is to determine if, as tariff rates decrease, notifications 
and rejections act as replacements.  It has already been determined that these notifications 
and rejections act as significant non-tariff barriers.  I model risk and protectionism as the 
two main factors that can increase the probability of earning a notification.  The idea of 
risk increasing the probability of earning a notification is very intuitive.  The greater the 
probability of risk associated with a product or exporter, the more likely it is that a 
notification will occur.  The more interesting portion of this model is protectionism.  
Tariff rates are used as a form of protectionism.  As tariffs decrease, there is concern that 
domestic demand for protection increases, which could increase the probability that the 
country may implement other barriers (i.e. notifications) as an alternate form of 
protection. The base model for this thesis is as follows: 
                                                                     (8) 
where 
                        (9) 
and 
                                      (10) 
where Xht is specific product characteristics, Zit and Zjt are specific country 
characteristics, Dij is distance from exporting country j to importing country i and        is 
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an instrumental variable (IV) prediction for tariff rates.  In the following section, I will 
describe specific variables used to capture risk and protectionism. 
3.2.1 Risk Variables 
Risk variables include product characteristics, exporting country characteristics, 
and distance.  It is expected that higher-risk products, such as perishable products will 
have a higher probability of receiving a notification.  Similarly, it is expected that higher-
risk exporters, particularly low-income countries, will have a higher probability of 
receiving a notification.  Distance also constitutes a risk factor, and it is expected that a 
greater distance increases risk and therefore increases the probability of receiving a 
notification. 
3.2.1.1 Country Characteristics 
 Country characteristics included in the risk portion of the model are used to 
identify those exporters that may be of higher risk of exporting products that do not meet 
EU standards.  First, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,       , is included with 
the expectation that as exporter income increases, the risk associated with that country 
decreases.  This relation is expected because developing countries may lack the financial 
support and education required to comply with production standards and contribute to a 
higher risk, which increases the probability of receiving a notification. 
I also include several variables to measure exporter experience.               is 
the total value imported into the EU by exporter j in year t.  It is expected that the smaller 
the value of exports from a country the higher the probability that the country may not 
meet EU standards because of the lack of familiarity and trust.  If the EU and the exporter 
have a good relationship and trade values are high then the lower the risk and the lower 
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the probability of receiving a notification.  I include dummy variables for new exporters, 
          , and for countries that never export seafood to the EU,          .  The 
dummy           is equal to 1 for exporters that do not trade in with importer i in year 
t-1 but do trade in year t.  It is expected that if this variable is one, the exporter is high 
risk, and therefore increases the probability of receiving a notification compared to an 
exporter who traded two years in a row.  The dummy           is equal to one for 
exporters that never export a specific product to a specific importer in the EU.  It is 
expected that if a country never exports a product, they have no risk and will decrease the 
probability of receiving a notification. 
 Also included as country characteristics are             and                , 
which are count variables.  These variables are included with the expectation that having 
a rejection or an alert in another developed country (the US) on a specific product 
indicates to the EU that these exporters and products are high risk.  As the count of both 
            and                increase it is expected that the risk increases and the 
probability of receiving a notification increases as a result. 
3.2.1.2 Product Characteristics 
 Specific product characteristics are included through       ,        , and 
Processedh dummy variables.  Because these three variables cover all possible products, 
Processedh will be included in the intercept.        , when equal to 1, refers to all fresh 
seafood products, including whole fish and filleted fish and denotes very high-risk 
products.  Fresh seafood needs to be kept at very specific temperatures to avoid spoilage 
and to minimize bacterial contamination.  Fresh seafood carries a higher level of risk than 
frozen and prepared seafood and will increase the probability of a notification.         , 
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when equal to1, includes all frozen seafood products including whole fish and filleted 
fish.  Frozen seafood products can also spoil easily, although it is expected that the risk is 
slightly smaller than for fresh seafood.  Frozen seafood also carries a high level of risk 
and will increase the probability of receiving a notification when compared to processed 
products.  Processedh is equal to 1 for the remainder of seafood products, and includes 
prepared products such as canned tuna and fish sticks.  Processedh is not included in the 
regression to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
Finally, I include a lag of the log of quantity imported,          , to control for 
the positive relation between quantity imported and the probability of receiving a 
notification.  Quantity needs to be controlled for so that increases in notifications we 
observe are not simply due to increases in trade flows. 
3.2.1.3 Distance 
 The distance between the exporter and importer,           , is also a risk factor 
in seafood trade, particularly when considering perishable, unprocessed, products.  The 
greater the distance a shipment must travel, the higher the probability of spoilage and 
contamination.  As distance increases, the farther a shipment has to travel, and the more 
time seafood has to spoil before it reaches port and finally consumers.  Greater distance 
could also be related to more contact surfaces from handling and transportation, 
increasing the probability of contamination and thus, increasing the probability of 
receiving a notification.  It is expected that as distance increases, the associated risk 
increases, and the probability of receiving a notification increases. 
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3.2.2 Protectionist Variables 
While risk should increase the probability of a notification, the protectionist 
variables examine a more interesting and political side of the story.  If standards are 
meant to limit the risk to human health, notifications should be correlated with risk 
factors.  However, if there is a strong relation between high demand for protection and 
high probabilities of notifications, it suggests that there is something other than science at 
play.  It allows us to question the validity of NTBs and how incidental they, as 
notifications, really are.  Overall it is expected that as demand for protection as a function 
of tariff rates and country and product characteristics increases, the probability of 
receiving a notification also increases. 
3.2.2.1 Tariff Rates 
 The main objective for this thesis is to determine if a relation between declining 
tariff rates and increasing notifications can be seen.  The main protectionist variable is the 
change in tariff rates.  Because tariff rates may be determined simultaneously with import 
standards, I instrument for the change in tariffs using variables that are unlikely to be 
correlated with the occurrence of a notifications.  As instruments, I include variables that 
do not directly affect the probability of a notification but do affect tariff rates.  These 
instruments include trade agreements and preferences, years, country characteristics, and 
product characteristics. 
 Trade agreements and preferences are broken down into regional trade 
agreements (RTAijt), free trade agreements (FTAijt), and least developed country (LDC) 
rates, LDCj.  Each of these three variables is a dummy variable.  RTAijt and FTAijt are 
equal to 1 if both importing and exporting countries are members of a regional or free 
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trade agreement during that time period. LDCj is equal to 1 if exporting country is 
considered an LDC.  The following income classifications are included as country 
characteristics: Lowmidincj, Upmidincj, Highincj, with Lowincj in the constant.  Income 
classifications are created according to World Bank classifications: low-income if GDP 
per capita is less than 996 dollars, low-middle-income if between 996 and 3,945 dollars, 
upper-middle-income if between 3,946 and 12,195 dollars, and high-income if greater 
than or equal to 12,196 dollars.  Dummy variables are created for two-digit and four-digit 
HS product codes to control for differences in tariff rates for different types of products.  
These include HS-16, and HS-0301 through HS-0307. 
 Both RTAijt and FTAijt are not seafood-specific agreements, but include all trade 
agreements involving the EU.  Because bilateral trade is largely driven by non-seafood 
products, I assume that specific seafood standards and import notifications will not 
influence the signing of a broad trade agreement.  It is expected that both variables will 
have a negative effect on tariff rates.  Full lists of RTA and FTA members along with 
LDCs can be found in Appendix B.  Because of the WTO, I expect to see a negative 
effect over time on tariff rates.  The base year in the first stage regression is 2008, so 
prior years, included as dummy variables, should have a positive impact on tariff rates 
compared with rates in 2008.  Years should not have a direct relation with creating EU 
notifications.  Income divisions and LDC are expected to reflect that many very low-
income countries are not a part of agreements with the EU, therefore they may experience 
higher rates than higher income countries.  
 The original tariff data include minimum rates, average rates, and maximum rates 
(as described in the following chapter), thus I include analyses for the average rate in 
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base models and use the maximum rates as a robustness check. The first stage regression 
is as follows: 
                                                                         (11) 
 Overall it is expected that both average and maximum tariff predicted values will 
have a negative relation with EU notifications.  As tariff rates are being limited by the 
WTO and decrease over time, importing countries may be replacing these “traditional” 
tariff barriers with NTBs, EU notifications in this thesis.  The difference in tariffs 
between time t and time t-1 is used and as tariff rates decrease, I expect that the 
probability of receiving a notification will increase. 
3.2.2.2 Country Characteristics 
Country characteristics of importers, Zit, play a significant role when determining 
the relation between demand for protection and notifications.  One significant cause for 
increased demand for protection is domestic fish production,            .  If EU 
countries produce large amounts of seafood domestically, domestic producers want to 
lower competition and, therefore, demand a higher level of protection from competitive 
imports.  It is expected that as domestic production increases, demand for protection 
increases, which in turn increases the probability of the occurrence of a notification.  
Importer income,       , is expected to increase the demand for protection resulting in 
a higher probability of a notification because countries with a higher GDP per capita can 
afford to protect domestic producers.  Import market share,           , is the share of 
imports by exporter, product, and year, and is expected to increase the demand for 
protection.  If one exporter covers the majority of the market for a specific product, it can 
be threatening for domestic producers in importing countries. 
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3.2.2.3 Product Characteristics 
 Product characteristics, Xht, are also expected to play a significant role when 
determining the relation between demand for protection and notifications, particularly in 
terms of prices.  As the relative price of products compared across countries, 
           , decreases, it may cause concern for domestic producers who may not be 
able to compete with lower priced goods.  This increase in price competition may cause 
an increased demand in protection and is expected to increase the probability of a 
notification.                is also included as a product characteristic.  Domestic 
producers of lower-priced products may be more vulnerable to cheaper imported products 
than producers of higher-priced products, and thus demand a higher level of protection. 
3.2.3 Fixed Effects 
 The base model in equation 8 is estimated by using random effects separately 
with average and maximum rates as a robustness check.  I include two additional fixed 
effects regressions per base model to control for effects that may not be observable for 
specific importing countries and exporting regions.  This allows me to control for 
importing country and exporting region fixed effects and observe which countries and 
regions have a higher probability of notification rates.  The two fully-specified fixed 
effects models are as follows: 
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(13) 
where k represents the following exporting regions: Africa, Antarctica, Central America 
and the Caribbean, Europe, the Middle East, North America, South America, South Asia, 
the South Pacific, and South East Asia.  Importing countries, i, can be found in Appendix 
D.
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Chapter 4: Data 
The data for this thesis were collected from several websites and databases 
detailed below.  Each piece was merged by importing country, exporting country, year, 
and product code where applicable.  The final panel dataset includes 470,368 
observations over a period of 11 years from 1998-2008, where the unit of observation is 
annual imports between two countries of a specific seafood product at the six-digit HS 
level.  The three key variables in the data include EU import notifications, trade flows, 
and tariff rates.  Tables 1 and 2 include summary statistics for all variables included in 
the first and second stage regressions, respectively.  I restrict my data to include only 
importers in the EU at the time of trade because only EU members can issue import 
notifications.  Because various tariff and other control data are not available for my entire 
sample, I am left with a sample of 281,904 observations.   
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Table 1. First Stage Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Tavgijht 6.797 7.721 0 100 
Tmaxijht 8.542 9.482 0 100 
y1998 0.088 0.283 0 1 
y1999 0.090 0.287 0 1 
y2000 0.095 0.293 0 1 
y2001 0.100 0.300 0 1 
y2002 0.099 0.299 0 1 
y2003 0.094 0.292 0 1 
y2004 0.089 0.285 0 1 
y2005 0.089 0.286 0 1 
y2006 0.088 0.284 0 1 
y2007 0.087 0.282 0 1 
RTAijt 0.417 0.493 0 1 
FTAijt 0.413 0.492 0 1 
hs_16 0.173 0.173 0 1 
hs_0302 0.152 0.359 0 1 
hs_0304 0.074 0.262 0 1 
hs_0305 0.093 0.290 0 1 
hs_0306 0.137 0.343 0 1 
hs_0307 0.141 0.348 0 1 
hs_0303 0.185 0.388 0 1 
LDCj 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Lowmidincj 0.135 0.342 0 1 
Upmidincj 0.161 0.367 0 1 
Highincj 0.530 0.499 0 1 
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Table 2. Second Stage Summary Statistics  
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
                   0.013 0.267 0 29 
            
Max Tariff 
-0.243 1.396 -8.899 2.048 
            
Max Tariff 
-0.306 1.760 -11.125 2.606 
                -1 5.899 4.330 0.516 32.353 
             1.350 6.531 0.004 2622.88 
             12806.37 19486.97 0 101868 
        0.209 0.407 0 1 
         0.362 0.478 0 1 
            4188.484 4103.113 59.617 19868.1 
           4.703 5.159 0 18.595 
           0.144 0.351 0 1 
            0.059 0.253 0 1 
                 140.011 623.684 0 12324 
             3.680 13.703 0 286 
              3.59E+09 4.97E+09 0 3.2E+10 
             0.264 1.534 0 84.280 
        16435.070 13261.55 81 56189 
        2067.280 9417.703 2413 56189 
4.1 EU Notifications 
EU rejections and notifications were downloaded from the RASFF portal 
(European Commission, 2009b).  The data originally included all products with 
notifications from 1998-2008.  I restricted the data to include only seafood products. 
Unfortunately, the data did not include HS codes so each product had to be coded by 
hand based on the product description provided.  Products were initially assigned a code 
at the two-digit level: HS-03 (Chapter 03) and HS-16 (Chapter 06).  These two-digit 
codes were further broken down into four-digit codes, including all Chapter 03 codes and 
the seafood divisions from Chapter 16, specifically HS-1604 and HS-1605.  The four-
digit codes were then broken down into the six-digit level.  This breakdown enables me 
to look at specific products rather than more general products, for example, frozen fillets 
versus all fillets.  A full list of included products and descriptions can be found in 
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Appendix C.  For simplicity all product codes in this dataset as well as any other data 
downloaded at the six-digit code level have been re-aggregated to the 1996 version of the 
Harmonized System.  This aggregation causes some loss of detail, but allows for 
consistency over time periods because new HS code divisions were added in 2002 and 
2007. 
If products were not specifically labeled and included only a simple description 
such as “tuna” or lacked important descriptions such as “whole” or “filleted”, then 
educated guesses were made based on previous seafood trading trends.  For example, if 
countries traded primarily filleted tuna and very little whole tuna for several years, the 
assumption was made that the product was probably filleted tuna.  These assumptions had 
to be made because too many products were poorly labeled to exclude them.  Simply 
excluding those observations would introduce bias into the sample because those trade 
flows would appear to be unaffected by import notifications.  Treating the notification as 
if it applied to the more general four-digit level, although a seemingly good idea, was 
avoided as much as possible because of aggregation of corresponding trade data.  If trade 
data were downloaded for HS-1604 then quantities and values were aggregated for all 
possible six-digit codes under HS-1604, which would have inflated the importance of a 
notification on one item to all possible items in the four-digit code for that year.  This is 
one of my main critiques of the RASFF system.  Although the data are available, many of 
the descriptions of products and notifications are poor.  A notification with the 
description of “Seafood” is not only hard to work with analytically, it could be difficult 
for countries to respond to the notification if it is unclear what product needs attention. 
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Continuing with the RASFF data, many different types of information were 
included:  the date of notification, notification type, action taken after notification, and 
specific hazard along with the reporting (importing) country and exporter.  The total 
number of notifications by year can be found in figure 1.  Decisions to implement 
notification are not based on the year (i.e. there are no notification quotas that need to be 
filled) even though there is an increasing trend over time. 
 
Figure 1. EU Import Notifications by Year 
After further examination of the five products and countries with the most 
notifications in figures 2 and 3, it can be seen that notifications are not necessarily tied to 
quantity.  Notifications were summed over products and exporting countries over all 
eleven years and then percentages were calculated for the five most flagged products and 
notifications.   I used the same top five products and exporters to calculate their 
respective percentages of quantity imported into the EU.  Looking specifically at the top 
five products that received notifications, we have, in order from greatest to smallest: 
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frozen shrimp (HS-030613), frozen fillets (HS-030420), fresh fillets (HS-030410), 
“other” frozen fish (HS-030379), and non-frozen shrimp (HS-030623).  If the 
percentages of notifications are compared to the percentages of quantity, then it can be 
seen that the top five products in terms of notifications vary greatly in terms of quantity.  
While frozen shrimp account for over 20 percent of all notifications, frozen shrimp only 
account for approximately 7 percent of imports into the EU.  Comparing across products, 
frozen fillets account for a much larger share of quantity imported than frozen shrimp, yet 
earn fewer notifications. 
 
Figure 2. Five Most Notified Products 
Moving to the five countries with the most import notifications, in percentage 
terms, we have, in order from highest to lowest percentage: Vietnam, Indonesia, China, 
India, and Thailand.  If the percentage of notifications is compared to percentage of 
quantity, notifications do not seem to be tied to quantity imported.  Notifications on 
products exported from Vietnam account for just over 11 percent of total notifications 
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while quantity imported into the EU from Vietnam only accounts for approximately 1 
percent of total quantity.  Thailand, who accounts for less that 8 percent of notifications, 
exports more to the EU than Vietnam at over 2 percent. 
 
Figure 3. Five Most Notified Exporters 
A total of 4,151 notifications are included in the data, with 79.4 percent of the 
total number resulting in rejection, detention, or re-dispatch, the most serious actions that 
can be taken.  Table 3 provides summary statistics for dummy variables that categorize 
notifications into three divisions: rejections (including detentions and re-dispatched 
products), destruction, and other.  The dependent variable for this analysis is 
                   which is the count of all notifications, regardless of action taken, 
summed over country pair from exporter (j) to importer (i), seafood product at the six-
digit HS code level (h), and year enacted (t).  The notifications are counted in this manner 
to allow for proper merging with other large portions of the data, namely trade flows and 
tariff rates which are specific to country pairs, individual products, and year.   
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Table 3. Notification Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max % of Total Notifications 
Rejection, Detention, or Re-dispatch 0.754 0.431 0 1 79.4% 
Destruction 0.104 0.305 0 1 12.6% 
Other Information 0.090 0.286 0 1 8% 
 
4.2 Risk Variables 
 As previously mentioned, I use data on exporter and product characteristics to 
capture the probability of receiving a notification based on risk.  Another portion of risk 
is distance.  I will explain the calculation of specific variables used as a proxy for risk in 
this section. 
4.2.1 Country Characteristics 
Data for the US rejections were obtained from the Economic Research Service 
(ERS) as in Baylis, Martens, and Nogueira (2009).  US import alert data were obtained 
from the FDA website (FDA, 2010).  These US data were matched with the EU 
notification data by country pair, product code, and year.                  and 
            are both counts very similar to                    but are summed at the 
two-digit HS code level rather than the six-digit code level.  Rejections are counts of 
products at the two-digit level from a specific exporter that are refused at the border 
while alerts are counts of products and exporters which the US government has deemed 
to be of concern and are further required to undergo increased scrutiny, including 
mandatory inspections or testing. 
The main variable for exporter experience,             , is the sum of the trade 
value, in current US dollars, of all imports into the EU by exporting country. Trade flow 
data were downloaded from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
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(UN COMTRADE) (UN COMTRADE, 2010).  Data were downloaded at the six-digit 
level for all seafood trade during the period 1998-2008 for all possible country pairs.  
Because the notification data from RASFF include only the EU, the trade data were later 
restricted to include only importing countries that are either a part of the EU or become a 
member state during this time period, starting with the EU-15 in 1998 and expanding to 
the EU-27 by 2008.  Exporting countries are all trading partners in the world.  A 
complete list of importer and exporter countries can be found in Appendix D.  For 
simplicity, I restricted all flows to include only imports, because the focus of this thesis is 
specifically on EU imports and notifications.  The COMTRADE data included import 
and exports of quantity by weight in kilograms as well as trade value in current US dollar 
values.  Both quantity and value will be included in varying forms in the analysis.   
Continuing with exporter country characteristics, dummy variables for new 
exporters,           , and non-exporters,          , are created by summing import 
values by product over the value by years.  If an exporter changes from a value of 0 to a 
non-zero value in the next year, they are considered new exporters and the dummy is 
equal to 1.  If an exporter always has a trade value of 0 for an individual product, then the 
dummy for non-exporter is equal to 1.  Exporter income        is GDP per capita and is 
sourced from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). 
4.2.2 Product Characteristics 
The quantity variable,          , is the lagged natural log of the quantity plus 1 in 
kilograms traded between countries j and i.  Using the lagged value allows prediction of 
future quantities while using the natural log to create a stationary variable.  This allows 
me to control for the possible relation between increased quantities of seafood products 
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traded over time and increased numbers of notifications.  I add 1 to the trade quantity 
prior to taking the log to keep zero trade flows in the dataset. 
Products based on the COMTRADE HS codes were divided into Freshh, Frozenh, 
and Processedh.  Each variable is a dummy variable (0 if no, 1 if yes) and created at the 
two- four- and six-digit HS code levels, depending on types of products included.  Freshh 
includes all fresh and live seafood products in all of HS-0301 and HS-0302, HS-030621 
through HS-030624, HS-030629, HS-030721, HS-030731, HS-030741, HS-030751, HS-
030791, as well as fillets in HS-030410.  Frozenh includes all frozen seafood products in 
all of HS-0303, HS-030611 through HS-030614, HS-030619, HS-030710, as well as 
frozen fillets in HS-030420.  Processedh includes all prepared seafood products in the 
HS-16 chapter as well as all products in the HS-0305 category.  
4.2.3 Distance 
The measure of distance,           , is in kilometers from capital to capital of 
importing and exporting countries.  If countries changed during time period (particularly 
in Eastern Europe), the distance to the closest current country capital was used. 
4.3 Protectionist Variables  
I include a series of variables to examine if importing countries with a high 
demand for protection are more likely to have a high number of notifications.  The main 
variable for protection is a measure of the change in tariff rates through the instrumental 
tariff variable prediction.   
4.3.1 Tariff Rates 
The third key variable in this dataset is tariff rates.  These rates were obtained 
from the WTO Tariff Analysis Online (TAO) (WTO, 2010).  The data included 
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minimum, average, and maximum rates for applied tariffs and bound tariffs, as well as 
products, countries, and groups of countries that are included at specific tariff rates.  The 
minimum, average, and maximum rates are due to variations in tariff rates over a one 
year period.  The majority of rates I use in the data are applied rates to measure actual 
rates, but if applied rates were missing and bound rates were available, the bound rates 
were used as a replacement.  This is done for average and maximum rates, which are both 
used for comparison in this analysis.  In general, bound rates were much higher than 
applied rates.  For example, the mean of total average applied rates in the raw tariff data 
was approximately half of the mean of the total average bound rates.  Because there are 
occasionally multiple average and maximum tariff lines for each product and country pair 
in one year, the median of the average and the median of the maximum was taken for 
these “duplicates” to create one average and one maximum rate per country pair per 
product per year.   
After this data manipulation, many rates were still missing.  Rates were filled in 
using three different steps of interpolation.  The first step linearly interpolated rates over 
country pair ij, year t, and product h at the six-digit level.  The second step again 
interpolated values linearly, but over product h at the four-digit level rather than the six-
digit level.  The third step followed the same method but at the two-digit level.  At this 
point, summary statistics were examined to look at the new tariff rates.  Table 4 includes 
original and interpolated summary statistics for both the average and maximum rates.  
The means and standard deviations for both the interpolated average and maximum rates 
are slightly higher than the original rates.  
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Table 4. Tariff Rate Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Average Rate 298,933 4.329 7.244 
Ipolated Average Rate 489,781 6.797 7.721 
Maximum Rate 298,933 5.403 8.861 
Ipolated Maximum Rate 489,781 8.542 9.482 
 
To better examine the effects of the interpolation, I graphed the overall 
maximums and averages by year of each of the four rates.  The trends follow the basic 
representation of expected tariff values over time both in terms of the interpolated and 
original rates (figures 4 and 5).  Figure 4 shows the overall maximums of the average rate 
and maximum rate before and after interpolation.  Figure 5 shows the averages of the 
average rate and maximum rate, before and after interpolation.  While the maximums of 
both the average and maximum rates are very similar, after interpolation, the average of 
both interpolated rates falls consistently above the original average and maximum rates.  
Because the average of the interpolated average falls within the average and maximum 
rates while following the pattern of both, this will be the main tariff variable used in the 
rest of the thesis, with interpolated maximum rates used as a robustness test. 
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Figure 4.  Maximums of Tariff Rates by Year, Before and After Interpolation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Averages of Tariff Rates by Year, Before and After Interpolation 
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4.3.2 Country Characteristics 
Import market share,           , is calculated from COMTRADE values as the 
share of importers per exporter per product per year. Importer production,            , 
was downloaded from the FAO (FAO, 2010) and is the importer domestic production by 
six-digit product code and year. Importer income, GDPpci, is GDP per capita and was 
obtained from the Penn World Table (UPenn, 2010). 
4.3.3 Product Characteristics 
All price calculations are performed on COMTRADE supplied data.  Price is 
calculated as trade value by country pair, product, and year divided by the quantity of the 
same observation.              is calculated by obtaining the mean of the price by 
exporter and dividing it by the median of price.  This calculation gives the relative price 
by exporter in relation to all other exporters of the same product in the same year.  The 
median price,               , is calculated as the median of price by product and then 
lagged. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Results and Discussion 
5.1 First Stage Regression 
To examine the strength of my instruments, I present the results of the first stage 
regressions for both average and maximum tariff rates in table 5, where column (1) 
contains results for average rates and column (2) contains results for maximum rates with 
overall R-squared values of 0.48 and 0.49, respectively.  The signs on the instrumental 
variables are consistent with expectations.  Both indicators of trade agreements RTAijt and 
FTAijt are negatively correlated with tariff rates.  The majority of years are correlated 
with a higher tariff rate than in 2008, which shows that over time, tariff rates are 
declining.  Prepared and high-value products are usually expected to have a higher tariff 
rate than unprocessed and low-value products, and we see this correlation in the data.  
Products from high-income countries tend to have a lower tariff rate compared to low-
income countries (included in the constant), which might suggests some level of 
protectionism in the EU.  Predicted values of the dependent variables from the first stage 
regression are            for average rates and in           for maximum rates.  The 
predicted level of average tariffs,          , will be used in the negative binomial base 
models and           will be used as a robustness test.  There tends to be a slightly 
stronger effect of most variables on maximum rates than on average rates.  
Table 5. First Stage Regression Results 
  (1) 
Average Rate 
(2) 
Maximum Rate Variables 
y1998 
-0.399*** 
(0.0264) 
-1.078*** 
(0.0326) 
y1999 
-0.332*** 
(0.0263) 
-0.334*** 
(0.0325) 
y2000 
-0.0357 
(0.0260) 
-0.181*** 
(0.0321) 
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Table 5. (cont.)   
y2001 
0.614*** 
(0.0257) 
0.463*** 
(0.0318) 
y2002 
-0.119*** 
(0.0257) 
-0.0731** 
(0.0318) 
y2003 
-0.457*** 
(0.0259) 
-0.495*** 
(0.0320) 
y2004 
0.141*** 
(0.0254) 
0.186*** 
(0.0314) 
y2005 
0.134*** 
(0.0253) 
0.171*** 
(0.0314) 
y2006 
0.0216 
(0.0254) 
0.0516 
(0.0314) 
y2007 
0.0101 
(0.0254) 
-0.0188 
(0.0314) 
RTAijt 
-5.786*** 
(0.0506) 
-6.994*** 
(0.0618) 
FTAijt 
-3.101*** 
(0.0481) 
-4.060*** 
(0.0587) 
hs_16 
7.120*** 
(0.116) 
6.958*** 
(0.137) 
hs_0302 
3.195*** 
(0.118) 
3.746*** 
(0.140) 
hs_0304 
2.085*** 
(0.130) 
4.265*** 
(0.154) 
hs_0305 
3.473*** 
(0.128) 
3.245*** 
(0.151) 
hs_0306 
3.558*** 
(0.120) 
3.487*** 
(0.142) 
hs_0307 
1.251*** 
(0.119) 
0.756*** 
(0.141) 
hs_0303 
2.344*** 
(0.115) 
2.725*** 
(0.136) 
LDCj 
1.317*** 
(0.0972) 
2.142*** 
(0.115) 
Lowmidincj 
0.452*** 
(0.0489) 
0.828*** 
(0.0593) 
Upmidincj 
-0.546*** 
(0.0525) 
-0.637*** 
(0.0636) 
Highincj 
-0.946*** 
(0.0500) 
-1.134*** 
(0.0603) 
Constant 
7.661*** 
(0.113) 
10.18*** 
(0.134) 
Observations 489,781 489,781 
Number of panel 55,261 55,261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2 Negative Binomial Regressions 
Tables 6, 6a, and 6b contain results for negative binomial regressions on the count 
of notifications as a function of predicted average tariff rates.  Columns (2) and (3) of 
table 6 contain results for the base model plus exporter regional fixed effects and 
importer country fixed effects, respectively.  Comparing across the three regressions in 
table 6, we can see that there are some changes in significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients when comparing column (1) to columns (2) and (3).  This difference 
indicates that significant time-invariant country and region effects are not accounted for 
in the random effects model, and that leaving out these variables biases other coefficient 
estimates.  Therefore, the country characteristics included in the base model do not 
appear to capture all of the country-level variation in notifications.  Based on these 
results, we should rely on the results from the fixed effects models for interpretation.  
In general, the coefficients from the negative binomial model can be interpreted 
as follows: a one unit change in a right-hand side variable causes a change in the 
difference in logs of the dependent variable equal to the coefficient.  Each of the three 
regressions shows that a drop in the average tariff rate, which may cause an increase in 
the demand for protection, also increases the probability of the occurrence of a 
notification.  Specifically looking at column (2), a one unit decrease in the change of 
average tariff rates increases the difference in logs of the probability of receiving a 
notification by 0.146.  This negative relation between change in tariff rates and 
notifications is expected and provides evidence in support of the argument that as tariff 
rates decline, they are being replaced with NTBs.   
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Further examination of variables representing protection shows that as the EU 
demands more protection, the probability of a notification increases.  As domestic 
production in tonnes increases, the probability of a notification also increases.  Median 
price loses significance across regressions, but as relative price (the price of a specific 
good from one exporter compared to all other prices) decreases, the probability of 
receiving a notification increases.  This negative relation represents the increased 
competition that occurs when an exporter is selling a relatively low-priced good.  The 
need for domestic protection increases and the probability of a notification increases as a 
result.  
Variables to capture risk in products and exporters also show expected results.  As 
products and exporters become riskier, the probability of a notification increases.  As the 
lagged value of quantity increases, we observe that there is a greater probability of a 
notification occurring.  We also see that as products become more perishable, they carry a 
higher risk resulting in a higher probability of a notification.  Both frozen and fresh 
products have a positive relation with notifications, and as expected, fresh products are 
more strongly correlated with receiving a notification than either frozen or processed 
products.  The coefficient on distance between importer and exporter flips to an 
unexpected sign in the region effects regression.  This could be because both Antarctica 
(far from the EU) and Africa (close to the EU) are included in the constant.  It is expected 
that as distance increases, risk also increases and we do see this relation in the base and 
importer fixed effects model.  In general, the results show that products carrying more 
risk are more likely to receive a notification. 
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All variables accounting for previous exporter experience show that as previous 
experience decreases, or if an exporter has a reputation of poor previous experience, these 
countries face an increased risk of an import notification.  The variable accounting for 
new exporters is only significant in the regional effects model, but is always positive 
showing that exporters who do not export to the EU in year t-1 are considered riskier.  
We also see that if an exporting country has a US rejection or a US alert on record, then 
the EU is more likely to see that country as high-risk and the probability of a notification 
increases.  Furthermore, if an exporter has little experience exporting to the EU the 
probability of receiving a notification also increases.  This result supports the hypothesis 
that as exporter risk increases, the probability of a notification increases. 
Table 6a shows exporter regional impacts on probabilities of notifications.  As 
previously mentioned, Africa and Antarctica are both included in the constant.  
Compared to these regions, exporters in Europe and the Middle East are less likely to 
receive a notification.  Exporters in South America, South East Asia, South Pacific, and 
South Asia are all more likely to receive a notification.  These results are expected 
because these regions contain primarily developing countries that may not have resources 
to conform to EU standards, which elevates risk for importers in the EU.  The 
coefficients on North America and Central America are also positive compared to Africa 
and Antarctica, but are not significantly different from zero.  The results for this 
regression imply that there are other regional exporter characteristics that contribute to 
risk that are not explicitly accounted for in the exporter characteristics variables.   
 Table 6b contains results for importer country fixed effects.  Smaller importers 
such as Austria, Cyprus, and Malta are included in the constant for this regression.  It is 
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expected that countries with high domestic production or high income will have a higher 
probability of issuing a notification.  In general, we see this effect with regard to Italy, 
Lithuania, Greece, and Estonia.  Lithuania and Estonia are on the Baltic Sea while Italy 
and Greece are on the Mediterranean.  Because all four of these countries are on the 
water and have greater access to seafood production, they conceivably demand more 
domestic protection.  Surprisingly, Slovenia has a very high probability of issuing a 
rejection, which signals that there are importer country characteristics not accounted for 
in the protectionist variables.   
 Overall, the results provided in tables 6, 6a, and 6b, show that not only high-risk 
exporters and products have a higher probability of receiving a notification, but importing 
countries that have a high demand for protection also have a higher probability of issuing 
a notification.  Specifically, I find evidence that as the change in tariff rates declines, 
these traditional barriers to trade are being replaced with NTBs in the form of import 
notifications.  After separating risk from protectionist motives I also find evidence that 
import notifications can be used as purposeful NTBs without legitimate reasons for use. 
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Table 6. Negative Binomial Regression Results with Average Rates 
Variables 
(1) 
Negative Binomial 
(2) 
Negative Binomial 
Exporter Regional Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Negative Binomial 
Importer Country Fixed 
Effects 
            
-0.0727*** 
(0.0275) 
-0.146*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.111*** 
(0.0280) 
MedianPricet-1 
-0.00192 
(0.00929) 
-0.0203** 
(0.00952) 
-0.000522 
(0.00950) 
Relpricejht 
-0.120** 
(0.0470) 
-0.113** 
(0.0457) 
-0.111** 
(0.0458) 
Fishprodiht. 
6.11e-06*** 
(1.32e-06) 
5.80e-06*** 
(1.31e-06) 
7.38e-06*** 
(1.51e-06) 
Freshh 
1.062*** 
(0.0935) 
1.210*** 
(0.0963) 
1.159*** 
(0.0955) 
Frozenh 
0.503*** 
(0.0760) 
0.549*** 
(0.0763) 
0.545*** 
(0.0766) 
Distanceij
 
0.000128*** 
(8.14e-06) 
-9.25e-05*** 
(1.97e-05) 
0.000132*** 
(8.10e-06) 
lnQijht-1 
0.199*** 
(0.00814) 
0.204*** 
(0.00820) 
0.185*** 
(0.00806) 
NoExpjht 
-0.27 
(0.169) 
-0.244 
(0.169) 
-0.308* 
(0.170) 
NewExpjht 
0.281 
(0.188) 
0.313* 
(0.188) 
0.243 
(0.188) 
USrejectionsjht 
0.000133*** 
(1.26e-05) 
0.000129*** 
(1.31e-05) 
0.000138*** 
(1.26e-05) 
USalertsjht  
0.00571*** 
(0.000782) 
0.00339*** 
(0.000782) 
0.00578*** 
(0.000792) 
Experiencej 
-3.13e-11*** 
(1.17e-11) 
-1.80e-11 
(1.30e-11) 
-0 
(0) 
Mktsharejht 
0.0439*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0371*** 
(0.0119) 
0.0342*** 
(0.0113) 
GDPpcj 
-6.88e-05*** 
(3.72e-06) 
-3.62e-05*** 
(4.30e-06) 
-7.01e-05*** 
(3.78e-06) 
GDPpci 
2.87e-06 
(3.66e-06) 
1.55e-06 
(3.68e-06) 
5.72e-05*** 
(9.71e-06) 
Region Effects No Yes No 
Country Effects No No Yes 
  Constant 
-5.443*** 
(0.176) 
-4.384*** 
(0.194) 
-8.889*** 
(0.424) 
Observations 281,940 281,940 281,940 
Number of panel 36,218 36,218 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base Regions = 
Africa, Antarctica 
Base Countries = Austria, 
Cyprus, Malta 
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Table 6a. Exporter Region FE Results with Average Rates 
Exporter Regions 
Exporter Regional 
Fixed Effects Coefficients 
Central America and Caribbean 
0.217 
(0.227) 
Europe 
-3.074*** 
(0.172) 
Middle East 
-0.373* 
(0.208) 
North America 
0.0841 
(0.215) 
South America 
0.593*** 
(0.157) 
South Asia 
0.710*** 
(0.132) 
South Pacific 
1.185*** 
(0.341) 
South East Asia 
1.009*** 
(0.137) 
Constant 
-4.384*** 
(0.194) 
Observations 281,940 
Number of panel 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base Regions =Africa, Antarctica 
 
Table 6b. Importer FE Results with Average Rates 
Importer Countries 
Importer Country 
Fixed Effect Coefficients 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
0.724* 
(0.404) 
Bulgaria 
1.404 
(1.079) 
Czech Republic 
0.850 
(0.620) 
Denmark 
1.200*** 
(0.362) 
Estonia 
3.258*** 
(0.469) 
Finland 
0.101 
(0.682) 
France 
1.313*** 
(0.330) 
Germany 
1.918*** 
(0.327) 
Greece 
2.878*** 
(0.362) 
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Table 6b. (cont.) 
Hungary 
0.844 
(0.801) 
Ireland 
-0.816 
(0.783) 
Italy 
3.178*** 
(0.324) 
Latvia 
0.673 
(1.072) 
Lithuania 
3.012*** 
(0.469) 
Netherlands 
-21.13 
(9,008) 
Poland 
2.342*** 
(0.441) 
Portugal 
2.403*** 
(0.382) 
Romania 
1.701 
(1.082) 
Slovakia 
1.995*** 
(0.588) 
Slovenia 
3.181*** 
(0.493) 
Spain 
2.722*** 
(0.339) 
Sweden 
1.576*** 
(0.381) 
United Kingdom 
1.716*** 
(0.331) 
Constant 
-8.889*** 
(0.424) 
Observations 281,940 
Number of panel 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base Countries = Austria, Cyprus, Malta 
 Elasticities for the negative binomial are calculated as the coefficient times the 
mean of the variable:        .  Table 7 contains calculated elasticities for select variables.  
The interpretation is in terms of percentages.  For example if         decreases by 10 
percent then the expected frequency of a notification occurring increases by 0.18 percent.  
Similarly, if             increases by 10 percent then the expected frequency of a 
notification increases by 0.78 percent.  While these effects seem small, if they are 
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compared to significant indicators of risk, specifically a US rejection or alert, then the 
effects of protectionist motives are relatively large.  Taking these elasticities into account, 
it is clear that the results provide evidence that protectionism plays a role in the use of EU 
import notifications. 
Table 7. Elasticity Calculations for Select Variables 
Variables 
(1) 
Negative Binomial 
(2) 
Exporter Region 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Importer Country 
Fixed Effects 
            -0.0177 -0.035 -0.027 
Fishprodiht 0.078 0.074 0.095 
Mktsharejht 0.012 0.010 0.009 
USrejectionjht 0.019 0.018 0.019 
USalertjht  0.021 0.012 0.021 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 
5.3 Robustness Tests  
 Table 8 contains results for Poisson regressions for both average and maximum 
tariff rates.  The results for both types of rates are very similar, and the results appear to 
be very robust across regression models.  No signs change between the two regressions, 
and all variables produce significant results at the 1 percent level except for 
MedianPriceht-1 and NewExpjht which are both insignificant.  The signs are as expected.   
 Because the data for this thesis are probably over-dispersed, standard errors may 
be reduced and the significance of these results overinflated.  It can be observed in the 
comparison between tables 8 and 6 that some variables lose their significance in the 
negative binomial models, providing evidence that the Poisson may have inflated 
significance as well as the large magnitude of change of coefficients associated with most 
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variables.  These results signal that the Poisson model was probably not a good fit for the 
data, and a negative binomial provides more reliable results.   
Table 8. Poisson Regression Results with Average and Maximum Rates 
 Variables 
(1) 
Average 
(2) 
Maximum 
            -0.198*** 
(0.0203)  
            
 
-0.130*** 
(0.0165) 
                 -0.0144 
(0.0103) 
-0.0154 
(0.0103) 
             -0.220*** 
(0.0463) 
-0.219*** 
(0.0462) 
Fishprodiht. 9.68e-06*** 
(1.63e-06) 
9.65e-06*** 
(1.63e-06) 
Freshh 1.278*** 
(0.109) 
1.277*** 
(0.108) 
Frozenh 0.733*** 
(0.0923) 
0.729*** 
(0.0921) 
Distanceij
 
0.000211*** 
(1.04e-05) 
0.000208*** 
(1.03e-05) 
lnQijht-1 0.152*** 
(0.00672) 
0.152*** 
(0.00672) 
           -0.739*** 
(0.137) 
-0.742*** 
(0.137) 
            -0.174 
(0.152) 
-0.178 
(0.152) 
USrejectionjht 0.000117*** 
(9.45e-06) 
0.000117*** 
(9.44e-06) 
USalertjht  0.00357*** 
(0.000603) 
0.00368*** 
(0.000600) 
Experiencejt -2.88e-11*** 
(9.80e-12) 
-2.99e-11*** 
(9.80e-12) 
Mktsharejht 0.0578*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0573*** 
(0.0113) 
GDPpcj -5.44e-05*** 
(3.06e-06) 
-5.36e-05*** 
(3.05e-06) 
GDPpci 1.85e-05*** 
(3.74e-06) 
1.76e-05*** 
(3.74e-06) 
Constant -7.410*** 
(0.159) 
-7.358*** 
(0.158) 
Observations 281,940 281,940 
Number of panel 36,218 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Because my tariff measures are imprecise, tables 9, 9a, and 9b present regression 
results using maximum tariff rates in negative binomial models to ensure my results are 
robust to different measures of tariffs.  Results are very similar between average rates in 
table 6 and maximum rates in table 9.  The change in average rates seems to have a larger 
overall effect on the probability of receiving a notification but the signs remain the same, 
suggesting that responses are similar to changes in both maximum and average rates.  As 
with the results using average rates, the fixed effects coefficients in columns (2) and (3) 
of table 9 tend to have a stronger effect than in the random effects regression.  We see the 
same expected patterns in terms of risk and protectionism: products and exporters 
carrying high risk are more likely to receive a notification while products and importers 
who demand a high level of protection tend to have a higher probability of issuing a 
notification.   
Due to concerns about including excess amounts of zeros, I estimate the model 
where trade flows that are zero in both year t and t-1are not included.  The results, 
reported in Appendix E, table 11 show that the large amount of zeros are not driving my 
results.  The magnitude of the coefficient for change in tariff rate becomes slightly 
stronger and the lag of median price becomes positive but not significant.   
To address concerns of endogeneity of trade quantity, in another robustness test, I 
include the predicted value of quantity based on the first and second lag of the natural log 
of quantity.  This predicted value does include quantities equal to 0 by adding 1 to the 
original quantity.  Comparing the results in table 12 with results in table 6 we can see that 
they are extremely similar.  No signs or significance change and the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are not significantly different from table 6.   
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EU import notifications are likely correlated over time.  To test if this serial 
correlation changes my primary results I re-run the model including a lag of the count of 
EU import notifications as an explanatory variable.  The results show that the probability 
of a notification occurring in year t is correlated with notifications occurring in year t-1.  
The other results for this model are extremely similar to results presented in table 6.   
For my last robustness test, I estimate a random effects and region fixed effects 
model where Antarctica is excluded and Africa is divided into North Africa and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  The base region for this test is the South Pacific while the base in table 6 
is Africa and Antarctica.  Again, we see that these results are also very robust.  More 
details and the estimation results of these robustness tests are reported in Appendix E.
 59 
Table 9. Negative Binomial Results with Maximum Rates 
Variables 
(1) 
Negative Binomial 
(2) 
Negative Binomial          
Region Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Negative Binomial          
Country Fixed Effects 
 -0.0471** 
(0.0220) 
-0.0929*** 
(0.0264) 
-0.0769*** 
(0.0225) 
MedianPriceht-1 
-0.00211 
(0.00929) 
-0.0206** 
(0.00952) 
-0.000749 
(0.00950) 
Relpricejht 
-0.121** 
(0.0470) 
-0.113** 
(0.0457) 
-0.111** 
(0.0458) 
Fishprodiht. 
6.10e-06*** 
(1.32e-06) 
5.80e-06*** 
(1.31e-06) 
7.41e-06*** 
(1.51e-06) 
Freshh 
1.061*** 
(0.0935) 
1.209*** 
(0.0962) 
1.158*** 
(0.0954) 
Frozenh 
0.502*** 
(0.0760) 
0.547*** 
(0.0762) 
0.544*** 
(0.0766) 
Distanceij
 
0.000128*** 
(8.12e-06) 
-9.27e-05*** 
(1.97e-05) 
0.000131*** 
(8.09e-06) 
lnQijht-1 
0.198*** 
(0.00814) 
0.204*** 
(0.00819) 
0.184*** 
(0.00806) 
NoExpjht 
-0.271 
(0.169) 
-0.245 
(0.169) 
-0.308* 
(0.170) 
NewExpjht 
0.281 
(0.188) 
0.311* 
(0.188) 
0.243 
(0.188) 
USrejectionsjht 
0.000132*** 
(1.26e-05) 
0.000129*** 
(1.31e-05) 
0.000138*** 
(1.26e-05) 
USalertsjht  
0.00573*** 
(0.000782) 
0.00344*** 
(0.000781) 
0.00581*** 
(0.000791) 
Experiencej 
-3.18e-11*** 
(1.17e-11) 
-0 
(0) 
-0 
(0) 
Mktsharejht 
0.0437*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0366*** 
(0.0119) 
0.0341*** 
(0.0113) 
GDPpcj 
-6.86e-05*** 
(3.72e-06) 
-3.57e-05*** 
(4.30e-06) 
-7.00e-05*** 
(3.78e-06) 
GDPpci 
2.65e-06 
(3.66e-06) 
1.28e-06 
(3.68e-06) 
5.71e-05*** 
(9.75e-06) 
Constant 
-5.432*** 
(0.176) 
-4.371*** 
(0.194) 
-8.879*** 
(0.425) 
Region Effects No Yes No 
Country Effects No No Yes 
Observations 281,940 281,940 281,940 
Number of panel 36,218 36,218 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base Regions =Africa, 
Antarctica 
Base Countries = 
Austria, Cyprus, Malta 
 
 

 ˆ T max ijht
 60 
Table 9a. Exporter Region FE Results with Maximum Rate 
Exporter Regions 
Exporter Regional 
Fixed Effects 
Central America and Caribbean 
0.213 
(0.227) 
Europe 
-3.061*** 
(0.172) 
Middle East 
-0.377* 
(0.208) 
North America 
0.0722 
(0.215) 
South America 
0.593*** 
(0.157) 
South Asia 
0.710*** 
(0.131) 
South Pacific 
1.180*** 
(0.340) 
South East Asia 
1.004*** 
(0.136) 
Constant 
-4.371*** 
(0.194) 
Observations 281,940 
Number of Panel 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base Regions =Africa, Antarctica 
    
Table 9b. Importer Country FE Results with Maximum Rates 
Importer Country 
Importer Country 
Fixed Effects 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
0.722* 
(0.404) 
Bulgaria 
1.429 
(1.079) 
Czech Republic 
0.854 
(0.621) 
Denmark 
1.201*** 
(0.362) 
Estonia 
3.259*** 
(0.469) 
Finland 
0.102 
(0.682) 
France 
1.313*** 
(0.330) 
Germany 
1.915*** 
(0.327) 
Greece 
2.876*** 
(0.362) 
Hungary 
0.853 
(0.801) 
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Table 9b. (cont.) 
Ireland 
-0.815 
(0.783) 
Italy 
3.177*** 
(0.324) 
Latvia 
0.674 
(1.072) 
Lithuania 
3.012*** 
(0.469) 
Netherlands 
-20.13 
(5,487) 
Poland 
2.342*** 
(0.442) 
Portugal 
2.401*** 
(0.382) 
Romania 
1.733 
(1.082) 
Slovakia 
2.003*** 
(0.588) 
Slovenia 
3.186*** 
(0.493) 
Spain 
2.719*** 
(0.339) 
Sweden 
1.577*** 
(0.381) 
United Kingdom 
1.713*** 
(0.331) 
Constant 
-8.879*** 
(0.425) 
Observations 281,940 
Number of Panel 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base Countries = Austria, Cyprus, Malta 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Discussion and Contributions 
 Research on NTBs has increased over the past 10 years, particularly with respect 
to SPS standards.  In general, research has found that standards act as trade barriers 
especially in the short run and for small, developing countries (Otsuki, Wilson, and 
Sewadeh, 2001; Anders and Caswell, 2003; Nguyen and Wilson, 2009, etc.).  More 
recently, the research focus has shifted to the effects on trade from implementation of 
standards through import rejections and notifications.  This research has found that 
rejections and notifications act as significant NTBs (Grant and Anders 2010, Baylis, 
Nogueira, and Pace, 2010). What previous research fails to address is the reason behind 
these rejections and notifications.  This thesis contributes to the literature by empirically 
examining the relation between tariff rates and NTBs in seafood trade, specifically by 
separating EU demand for protection from the inherent risk of products and exporters. 
The two main objectives for this thesis are to determine if there is a negative 
correlation between notifications as NTBs and the reduction in tariff rates, and if there 
are signs of protectionism in the use of NTBs.  I find evidence to support both of these 
claims.  The EU, one of the world’s largest seafood importers, tracks import notifications 
through the RASFF system.  Using a count of these notifications by importer, exporter, 
product code, and year, I find that as tariff rates decrease, the probability of a notification 
increases.  I also find that importing countries in the EU who demand high levels of 
protection for reasons other than decreasing tariff rates also have a higher probability of 
issuing a notification.   
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 I include explanatory variables related to risk and protectionist characteristics to 
separate the effects that risk and demand for protection have on notifications.  Importer 
country fixed effects and exporter region fixed effects are included to control for 
characteristics not explicitly included in the other explanatory variables.  I find that high-
risk exporters, determined by income and trade experience, have a higher probability of 
receiving a notification than low-risk exporters.  Using country fixed effects, I find that 
exporters in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia are particularly likely to receive a 
notification, which supports the idea that high-risk exporters are likely to receive a 
notification.  This finding was expected after examining what specific exporting countries 
have the highest number of notifications.  Similar results are found for high-risk products, 
determined primarily by perishability.  High-risk products and high-risk exporters have a 
higher probability of receiving a notification compared to low-risk products and low-risk 
exporters, which provides evidence that EU import notifications are effective in terms of 
risk.   
On the other hand, analysis on protectionist variables shows that high-income 
importers who produce large amounts of seafood domestically have a higher probability 
of issuing a notification.  I find that Estonia, Italy, and Lithuania are significantly more 
likely to implement a notification than other EU member states, which makes sense 
because they are all countries with access to water.  Analysis also shows that when 
importers are threatened by relatively low-priced goods, they are more likely to issue a 
notification.  These results suggest that the demand for protection plays an important role 
in the probability of implementing a notification. 
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 Overall, the results of this thesis are very interesting.  I find that importing 
countries in the EU have a high demand for protection are more likely to interfere with 
imports through import notifications. This brings me to question the reasoning behind the 
implementation of standards.  While it is true that SPS standards must have valid and 
testable backing in science, the results for this thesis show that NTBs may still be used 
intentionally to keep competition low in the EU. 
6.2 Implications 
 WTO requirements are set in place to ensure SPS standards are only used for 
legitimate, scientifically-backed health and safety protection but do not appear to be 
working as intended.  The results for this thesis show that the implementation of 
standards may be used directly for protectionist purposes.  Policy makers should take the 
flexibility in standard implementation into consideration when designing trade rules.  As 
they stand, rules for implementation of SPS standards are not strong enough to prevent 
intentional use of NTBs.   
In the case of the EU, allowing individual member states to interpret and 
implement standards is a problem.  All EU members must meet minimum EC standards, 
but it is clear that countries with higher protectionist motives are using a more strict 
interpretation and implementation of EC standards to block imports. There is the 
potential concern that non-EU countries with individually set standards may have more 
freedom to implement standards.   This could be due to lack of unification, and therefore 
comparison, with other countries’ implementation standards.  For example if Italy, on 
average, issued many times the number of notifications than other EU member states, it 
 65 
might be more of a red flag than, say, for the US or Japan who have their own sets of 
standards, and therefore a lack of baseline comparison. 
6.3 Limitations 
 While the results for this thesis prove very promising, there are a number of 
limitations to my research.  One of the main problems was the creation of HS codes 
based on product descriptions.  Many product descriptions in the RASFF data were 
vague, which resulted in guessing product codes based on previous trade trends to avoid 
dropping to the two- or four-digit level.  Also, because I handwrote code in Stata to 
assign product codes at the six-digit level to thousands of notifications, there are likely 
mistakes in HS coding due to human error.   
 Another limitation is the number of missing tariff rates in the initial data.  Rates in 
the WTO TAO are self reported by implementing countries, and there were many 
countries missing multiple year or product rates.  I used linear interpolation to fill in some 
of the missing tariff rates.  Although the interpolated rates followed a very similar pattern 
to the original rates, the interpolated rates tended to be higher, on average, than the 
original rates. 
 Finally, it is clear after examination of the fixed effects models that there are 
characteristics probably not accounted for in the model.  This model is simplified and it is 
likely that risk and protectionism are not the only motives for use of NTBs.  Also, this 
thesis does not address what or who is directly driving protectionism in the EU.  Baylis, 
Martens, and Nogueira (2009) find that specific political motives increase the probability 
of NTBs in the US.  This may be the case in the EU, but political actions were not 
explicitly measured. 
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6.4 Future Work 
 While this thesis begins to fill the research gap, there is still much work to be 
done, and many directions this research can go.  Specifically, future research should 
attempt to address the following: 
1. General focus should shift from whether or not standards are acting as barriers 
to why they are acting as barriers.  Are there other motives behind NTBs than 
protectionism and risk? 
2. Do we see these protectionist patterns in other developed countries, 
particularly in the US?  How do these specific motives impact trade? 
3. Are specific types of notifications more likely to be used as protectionist 
barriers?  For example, rejections versus no-action notifications in the EU and 
rejections versus alerts in the US. 
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Appendix A: EU Regulations  
Table 10. EU Regulations on Food Safety and the Seafood Industry
Regulation Effective Dates Description Amendments 
Council Directive 
91/496/EEC 
08/19/1991-
present 
Allows veterinary 
checks on products 
entering the EU 
Decision 92/438/EEC  
Directive 96/45/EC 
Decision 2006/104/EC 
Council Directive 
91/67/EC 
1991-present Placing aquaculture on 
market, health 
conditions, List I-III 
diseases 
Directive 93/54/EEC  
Directive 95/22/EC  
Directive 97/79/EC  
Directive 98/45/EC  
No. 806/2003 
Commission Decision 
94/722/EC 
1994-present Approval of zones and 
farms 
 
Council Directive 
97/78/EC 
1997-present Allows veterinary 
checks on products 
entering the EU 
12003TNO2/06/B1 
No. 882/2004 
Directive 2006/104/EC 
Commission Decision 
1999/567/EC 
1999-2009 Rules for List II 
diseases 
 
EC Regulation No. 
178/2002 
02/21/2002 - 
present 
General requirements 
of food law, EFSA, 
RASFF 
No. 1642/2003 
No. 575/2006 
No. 202/2008 
No. 596/2009   
Council Directive 
2006/88/EC 
10/24/2006-
8/1/2008 
Rules for placing on 
the market of 
aquaculture products 
both within the EU and 
imports from non-
member states 
Directive 2008/53/EC 
Commission Decision 
2002/308/EC 
04/2002-
08/01/2009 
Approval of zones and 
farms specifically for 
VHS and IHN diseases 
Decision 2002/536/EC  
Decision 2002/1005/EC  
Decision 2003/114/EC  
Decision 2003/458/EC  
Decision 2003/839/EC  
Decision 2004/373/EC  
Decision 2004/850/EC  
Decision 2005/107/EC  
Decision 2005/475/EC 
Commission Decision 
2002/300/EC   
2002-present Approved zones for 
Bonamia ostreae and 
Marteillia refringens 
Decision 2003/378/EC  
Decision 2003/729/EC  
Decision 2005/104/EC  
Decision 2005/748/EC 
Commission Decision 
2003/634/EC  
 
2003-present Approved zones for 
VHS and IHN 
Decision 2003/904/EC  
Decision 2004/328/EC  
Decision 2005/67/EC  
Decision 2005/414/EC  
Decision 2005/770/EC 
Commission Decision 
2003/390/EC 
2003-present Rules for List II 
diseases 
No. 1251/2008 
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Table 10. (cont.) 
Commission Decision 
2003/858/EC 
2003-present Rules for imports from 
non-EU members 
Decision 2004/454/EC  
Decision 2004/914/EC  
Decision 2005/742/EC 
Commission Decision 
2003/804/EC 
2003-2009 Rules for imports of 
live fish and eggs 
intended for farming or 
human consumption 
Decision 2004/319/EC  
Decision 2004/609/EC  
Decision 2004/623/EC  
Decision 2005/409/EC 
Decision 2006/680/EC 
Decision 2006/767/EC 
No. 1792/2006 
Decision 2007/158/EC 
Decision 2008/641/EC 
Commission Decision 
2004/453/EC 
04/30/2004-
05/14/2010 
Rules for List III 
diseases 
Decision 2006/272/EC 
 
EC Regulation No. 
1251/2008 
01/01/2009-
present 
Implementation of 
2006/88/EC for 
condition and 
certification 
requirements 
No. 719/2009 
No. 346/2010 
No. 1143/2010 
No. 1252/2008 
Commission Decision 
2009/177/EC 
01/01/2009-
present 
Implementation of 
2006/88/EC for 
surveillance and 
eradication programs 
 
EU Regulation No. 
175/2010 
06/03/2010 Implementation of 
2006/88/EC for control 
of increased mortality 
of oysters 
No. 1153/2010 
Commission Decision 
2010/221/EU 
2010-present Implementation of 
2006/88/EC for 
limiting impacts of 
diseases 
Decision 2010/761/EU 
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Appendix B:  EU Trade Agreements 
 
B.1  Free Trade Agreements with the EU 
 
 
1. Antigua, entered into force 2008 
2. Bahamas, entered into force 2008 
3. Barbados, entered into force 2008 
4. Belize, entered into force 2008 
5. British Virgin Isds., entered into force 2008 
6. Chile, entered into force 2003 
7. Croatia, entered into force 2002 
8. Dominica, entered into force 2008 
9. Israel, entered into force 2001 
10. Jamaica, entered into force 2008 
11. Jordan, entered into force 2003 
12. Lebanon, entered into force 2006 
13. Macedonia, entered into force 2002 
14. Mexico, entered into force 2000 
15. Morocco, entered into force 2001 
16. Netherlands Antilles, entered into force 2008 
17. Panama, entered into force 2008 
18. South Africa, entered into force 2000 
19. Syria, entered into force 2008 
20. Trinidad and Tobago, entered into force 2008 
21. Tunisia, entered into force 1998 
 74 
22. Turkey, entered into force 1996 
23. Turks and Caicos Isds., entered into force 2008 
 
B.2  Regional Trade Agreements with the EU 
 
1. European Free Trade Association (EFTA), entered into force 1973 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
2. Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA), entered into force 1994, ended 2004 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
3. Indian Ocean Commission (COI), entered into force 1984 
Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, France 
 
B.3  Least Developed Countries 
 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Isds.,  Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, 
Zambia
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Appendix C:  Product Codes and Descriptions 
HS-030110 Live ornamental fish 
HS-030191 Live trout 
HS-030192 Live eels 
HS-030193 Live carp 
HS-030199 Live other 
HS-030211 Fresh trout 
HS-030212 Fresh Pacific salmon 
HS-030219 Fresh other salmonidae 
HS-030221 Fresh halibut and Greenland turbot 
HS-030222 Fresh plaice 
HS-030223 Fresh sole 
HS-030229 Fresh other flat fish 
HS-030231 Fresh albacore tuna 
HS-030232 Fresh yellowfin tuna 
HS-030233 Fresh skipjack or stripe-bellied bonito 
HS-030239 Fresh other tuna 
HS-030240 Fresh herrings 
HS-030250 Fresh cod 
HS-030261 Fresh sardines 
HS-030262 Fresh haddock 
HS-030263 Fresh Atlantic Pollock 
HS-030264 Fresh mackerel 
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HS-030265 Fresh dogfish and other shark 
HS-030266 Fresh eels 
HS-030269 Fresh other fish 
HS-030270 Fresh livers and roes 
HS-030310 Frozen Pacific salmon 
HS-030321 Frozen trout 
HS-030322 Frozen Atlantic salmon 
HS-030329 Frozen other salmonidae 
HS-030331 Frozen halibut and Greenland turbot 
HS-030332 Frozen plaice 
HS-030333 Frozen sole 
HS-030339 Frozen other flat fish 
HS-030341 Frozen albacore tuna 
HS-030342 Frozen yellowfin tuna 
HS-030343 Frozen skipjack or strip-bellied bonito 
HS-030349 Frozen other tuna 
HS-030350 Frozen herring 
HS-030360 Frozen cod 
HS-030371 Frozen sardines 
HS-030372 Frozen haddock 
HS-030373 Frozen Atlantic Pollock 
HS-030374 Frozen mackerel 
HS-030375 Frozen dogfish and other sharks 
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HS-030376 Frozen eels 
HS-030377 Frozen sea bass 
HS-030378 Frozen whiting and hake 
HS-030379 Frozen other fish 
HS-030380 Frozen livers and roes 
HS-030410 Fresh fillets 
HS-030420 Frozen fillets 
HS-030490 Fresh or frozen pieces 
HS-030510 Flours, meals, pellets of fish for human consumption 
HS-030520 Livers and roes, dried, smokes, salted, or in brine 
HS-030530 Fish fillets, dried, salted, or in brine, not smoked 
HS-030541 Smoked pacific salmon 
HS-030542 Smoked herrings 
HS-030549 Smoked other 
HS-030551 Dried cod, may be salted, not smoked 
HS-030559 Dried other, may be salted, not smoked 
HS-030561 Salted herring, not dried or smoked 
HS-030562 Salted cod, not dried or smoked 
HS-030563 Salted anchovies, not dried or smoked 
HS-030569 Salted other, not dried or smoked 
HS-030611 Frozen rock lobster and crawfish 
HS-030612 Frozen lobster 
HS-030613 Frozen shrimps and prawns 
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HS-030614 Frozen crabs 
HS-030619 Frozen other crustaceans 
HS-030621 Not frozen rock lobster and crawfish 
HS-030622 Not frozen lobster 
HS-030623 Not frozen shrimps and prawns 
HS-030624 Not frozen crabs 
HS-030629 Not frozen other crustaceans 
HS-030710 All oysters 
HS-030721 Live, fresh, or chilled scallops 
HS-030729 Other scallops 
HS-030731 Live, fresh, or chilled mussels 
HS-030739 Other mussels 
HS-030741 Live, fresh, or chilled cuttle fish and squid 
HS-030749 Other cuttle fish and squid 
HS-030751 Live, fresh, or chilled octopus 
HS-030759 Other octopus 
HS-030760 All snails, not sea snails 
HS-030791 Live, fresh, or chilled sea urchin, conch, clams, other 
HS-030799 Other abalone, clams, other 
HS-160300 Extracts and juices of fish or crustaceans 
HS-160411 Prepared or preserved salmon, whole or in pieces but not minced 
HS-160412 Prepared or preserved herrings, whole or in pieces but not minced 
HS-160413 Prepared or preserved sardines whole or in pieces but not minced 
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HS-160414 Prepared or preserved tuna, whole or in pieces but not minced 
HS-160415 Prepared or preserved mackerel, whole or in pieces but not minced 
HS-160416 Prepared or preserved anchovy, whole or in pieces but not minced 
HS-160419 Prepared or preserved other, whole or in pieces but not minced 
HS-160420 Other prepared or preserved fish (sticks, balls, pastes, etc) 
HS-160430 Caviar and caviar substitutes 
HS-160510 Prepared or preserved crab 
HS-160520 Prepared or preserved shrimps and prawns 
HS-160530 Prepared or preserved lobster 
HS-160540 Prepared or preserved other crustaceans 
HS-160590 Prepared or preserved other (mollusks etc.) 
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Appendix D: Countries 
Importers:         
Austria 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
 
Exporters: 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria                         
American Samoa                                
Andorra                                 
Angola 
Anguilla 
Antarctica 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia                   
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas                                
Bahrain                             
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Belize 
Benin                                
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
 
 
 
Br. Indian Ocean Terr. 
Br. Virgin Isds 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Bunkers 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi                               
Cambodia                               
Cameroon                                 
Canada 
Cape Verde                         
Cayman Isds 
Central African Rep.                                   
Chad                                  
Chile 
China                         
Christmas Isds                             
Cocos Isds                               
Colombia                                
Comoros                                  
Congo                              
Cook Isds                             
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba                                 
Cyprus  
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
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Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic                                 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador                      
Equatorial Guinea                                
Eritrea                                
Estonia                               
Ethiopia                            
Faeroe Isds                          
Falkland Isds                                   
Fiji                                
Finland 
Fr. South Antarctic Terr.                                 
France 
French Polynesia 
FS Micronesia                                  
Gabon                                 
Gambia                                
Georgia                                
Germany                                  
Ghana                              
Gibralter                                 
Greece                              
Greenland                                
Grenada                                   
Guam                              
Guatemala                                 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau                                 
Guyana                                  
Haiti
Heard & McDonald Isds 
Holy See 
Honduras 
Hong Kong                                
Hungary                                
Iceland                                  
India                              
Indonesia                                   
Iran                                   
Iraq                                
Ireland                                 
Israel
Italy 
Jamaica  
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea D.P.RP 
Kuwait                             
Kyrgyzstan                                  
Laos                                 
Latvia                                
Lebanon                                
Lesotho                                
Liberia                                  
Libya                              
Lithuania                             
Madagascar                                 
Malawi                               
Malaysia        
Maldives                                   
Mali                                  
Malta                          
Marshal Isds                             
Mauritania                              
Mauritius                                
Mayotte                                 
Mexico                               
Mongolia                             
Montserrat                                
Morocco                             
Mozambique                                
Myanmar 
N. Mariana Isds                                
Namibia                                  
Nauru                                  
Nepal 
Neth. Antilles 
Netherlands 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand  
Nicaragua                                  
Niger                                
Nigeria                                   
Niue                           
Norfolk Isds     
Norway 
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Occ. Palestinian Terr. 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau                                 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea                               
Paraguay                                   
Peru                            
Philippines                               
Pitcairn                                 
Poland                               
Portugal                                  
Qatar 
Rep. of Korea 
Rep. of Moldova                                
Romania                                 
Russia                                 
Rwanda 
St Helena 
St Kitts & Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Pierre & Miquelon          
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines  
Samoa 
San Marino 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Saudi Arabia                                
Senegal 
Serbia and Montenegro                             
Seychelles                           
Sierra Leone                              
Singapore                        
Slovak Republic                                
Slovakia                            
Slovenia                            
Solomon Isds 
Somalia                           
South Africa 
South Georgia & The 
South Sandwich Isds  
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria                           
Tajikistan                                 
Taiwan                               
Tanzania 
TFYR of Macedonia  
Thailand                            
Timor-Leste                                   
Togo                                
Tokelau                                  
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago        
Tunisia                                 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Turks & Caicos Isds                                 
Tuvalu                                 
Uganda                                
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom                                
Uruguay 
US Pacific Islands                                     
United States                             
Uzbekistan                                
Vanuatu                              
Venezuela                                
Vietnam 
Wallis & Futuna Isds                                  
Yemen                                  
Zaire                                 
Zambia                               
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix E: Robustness Tests 
 
Table 11 includes results for a robustness test where quantities in year t and 
quantities in t-1are not included if equal to 0.  The models in table 6 include all quantities 
equal to 0 by adding 1 before taking the natural log.  The results in table 11 show that 
dropping quantities equal to 0 reduces the number of observations by half but the results 
are very similar to the original base model.  The magnitude of the coefficient for change 
in tariff rate becomes slightly stronger and the lag of median price becomes positive but 
not significant.  As expected, after excluding the 0 quantities, quantity has a slightly 
larger effect on import notifications than in table 6.  Even with some small changes, the 
results for this test show the model is relatively robust. 
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Table 11. Negative Binomial Excluding Zero Quantities and Zero Lagged Quantities 
  
Variables 
(1) 
EUnotification 
            
-0.0912*** 
(0.0305) 
MedianPriceht-1 
0.0151 
(0.0107) 
Relpricejht 
-0.0489** 
(0.0449) 
Fishprodiht 
4.23e-06*** 
(1.42e-06) 
Freshh 
1.112*** 
(0.108) 
Frozenh 
0.468*** 
(0.0811) 
Distanceij
 
0.000122*** 
(8.95e-06) 
lnQijht-1 
0.342*** 
(0.0142) 
USrejectionsjht 
0.000136*** 
(1.30e-05) 
USalertsjht  
0.00545*** 
(0.000815) 
Experiencejt 
-4.11e-11*** 
(1.27e-11) 
Mktsharejht 
0.00856 
(0.0124) 
GDPpcj 
-7.40e-05*** 
(4.14e-06) 
GDPpci 
-3.21.e-06 
(4.12e-06) 
Constant 
-7.306*** 
(0.244) 
Observations 141,281 
Number of panel 39,372 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12 includes the predicted value of quantity based on the first and second lag 
of the natural log of quantity.  This predicted value does include quantities equal to 0 by 
adding 1 to the original quantity.  This allows control over large changes in quantity 
imported over a period of a few years.  Comparing the results in table 12 with results in 
table 6 we can see that they are extremely similar.  No signs or significance change and 
the magnitudes of the coefficients are not significantly different from table 6.  Robustness 
tests in both 11 and 12 show that the model is robust to large changes in quantity over a 
short period of time. 
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Table 12. Negative Binomial Using Predicted Quantity using First and Second Lag 
of Log of Quantity 
  (1) 
Variables EUnotification 
            -0.0743*** 
(0.0277) 
MedianPriceht-1 -0.00228 
(0.00935) 
Relpricejht -0.110** 
(0.0466) 
Fishprodiht. 5.52e-06*** 
(1.33e-06) 
Freshh 1.127*** 
(0.0945) 
Frozenh 0.498*** 
(0.0767) 
Distanceij
 
0.000131*** 
(8.19e-06) 
     0.269*** 
(0.0101) 
NoExpjht -0.192 
(0.168) 
NewExpjht 0.363* 
(0.187) 
USrejectionsjht 0.000131*** 
(1.26e-05) 
USalertsjht  0.00541*** 
(0.000784) 
Experiencej -0*** 
(0) 
Mktsharejht 0.0347*** 
(0.0115) 
GDPpcj -6.94e-05*** 
(3.74e-06) 
GDPpci 2.38e-06 
(3.70e-06) 
Constant -5.812*** 
(0.180) 
Observations 281,345 
Number of panel 36,201 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 includes results for a robustness test to include a lag of the count of EU 
import notifications.  It is likely that the occurrence of a notification is not independent 
over time, so this test controls for that relation.  Examination of the results shows that the 
probability of a notification occurring in year t is correlated with notifications occurring 
in year t-1.  The results for this test are extremely similar to results in table 6.  
Significance and signs stay the same and the magnitude of coefficients are very similar.  
The coefficients for US rejections and alerts decrease slightly, which makes sense.  
Previous EU notifications are probably a more serious, immediate risk for the EU than 
products and exporters who have rejections or alerts in the US.  The results for this 
robustness test show that the model is very robust. 
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Table 13. Negative Binomial Including Lag of EU notifications 
  
Variables 
(1) 
EUnotification 
            
-0.0747*** 
(0.0273) 
EUnotificationijht-1 
0.0620*** 
(0.00796) 
MedianPriceht-1 
-0.00363 
(0.00925) 
Relpricejht 
-0.121** 
(0.0468) 
Fishprodiht 
5.92e-06*** 
(1.31e-06) 
Freshh 
1.053*** 
(0.0926) 
Frozenh 
0.482*** 
(0.0754) 
Distanceij 
0.000127*** 
(8.05e-06) 
lnQijht-1 
0.196*** 
(0.00809) 
NoExpjht 
-0.282* 
(0.168) 
NewExpjht 
0.268 
(0.188) 
USrejectionsjht 
0.000121*** 
(1.29e-05) 
USalertsjht 
0.00498*** 
(0.000795) 
Experiencejt 
-0*** 
(0) 
Mktsharejht 
0.0449*** 
(0.0111) 
GDPpcj 
-6.81e-05*** 
(3.70e-06) 
GDPpci 
3.14e-06 
(3.63e-06) 
Constant 
-5.451*** 
(0.175) 
Observations 281,940 
Number of panel 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14 includes results for a random effects and region fixed effects model 
where Antarctica is excluded and Africa is divided into North Africa and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The base region for this test is the South Pacific while the base in table 6 is 
Africa and Antarctica.  Comparing these results to columns (1) and (2) in table 6 we see 
that these results are also very robust.  Antarctica had very few observations (N<500), so 
dropping these had little effect.  Surprisingly, Sub-Saharan Africa appears to have a 
slightly lower probability of receiving a notification than North Africa when compared to 
the South Pacific.  The results for this test are consistent with those in table 6, showing 
that the South Pacific is the most likely region to receive a notification while the EU is 
the least.  Again, the results for this test show that the model is robust. 
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Table 14. Negative Binomial Dividing Africa into North and Sub-Saharan and 
Excluding Antarctica 
  (1) (2) 
Variables EUnotification Exporter Region Fixed Effects 
            
-0.0727*** 
(0.0275) 
-0.143*** 
(0.0334) 
MedianPriceht-1 
-0.00192 
(0.00929) 
-0.0198** 
(0.00952) 
Relpricejht 
-0.120** 
(0.0470) 
-0.117** 
(0.0462) 
Fishprodiht 
6.11e-06*** 
(1.32e-06) 
5.75e-06*** 
(1.31e-06) 
Freshh 
1.062*** 
(0.0935) 
1.209*** 
(0.0963) 
Frozenh 
0.503*** 
(0.0760) 
0.557*** 
(0.0765) 
Distanceij
 
0.000128*** 
(8.14e-06) 
-7.42e-05*** 
(2.38e-05) 
lnQijht-1 
0.199*** 
(0.00814) 
0.204*** 
(0.00819) 
NoExpjht 
-0.270 
(0.169) 
-0.242 
(0.169) 
NewExpjht 
0.281 
(0.188) 
0.317* 
(0.188) 
USrejectionsjht 
0.000133*** 
(1.26e-05) 
0.000128*** 
(1.31e-05) 
USalertsjht 
0.00571*** 
(0.000782) 
0.00343*** 
(0.000782) 
Experiencej 
-0*** 
(0) 
-0 
(0) 
Mktsharejht 
0.0439*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0357*** 
(0.0120) 
GDPpcj 
-6.88e-05*** 
(3.72e-06) 
-3.60e-05*** 
(4.30e-06) 
GDPpci 
2.87e-06 
(3.66e-06) 
1.46e-06 
(3.68e-06) 
Central America and Caribbean 
-0.800** 
(0.357) 
Europe 
 
-3.943*** 
(0.460) 
Middle East 
-1.313*** 
(0.423) 
North America 
-0.884** 
(0.376) 
North Africa 
 
-0.763* 
(0.458) 
South Africa 
 
-0.446 
(0.286) 
South Asia 
 
-0.268 
(0.348) 
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Table 14. (cont.) 
South East Asia 
-0.0152 
(0.289) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
-1.009*** 
(0.364) 
Constant 
-5.443*** 
(0.176) 
-3.533*** 
(0.496) 
Observations 281,940 281,940 
Number of panel 36,218 36,218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
